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Abstract 
This  paper  analyses  the  regulatory  framework  which  applies  to  the  determination  of  directors’ 
remuneration in Europe and examines the extent to which European firms follow best practices in 
corporate governance in this area, drawing on an empirical analysis of the governance systems that 
European firms adopt in setting remuneration and, in particular, on an empirical assessment of their 
diverging  approaches  to  disclosure.  These  divergences  persist  despite  recent  reforms.  After  an 
examination of the link between optimal remuneration, corporate governance and regulation and an 
assessment of how regulatory reform has evolved in this area, the paper provides an overview of 
national laws and best practice corporate governance recommendations across the Member States, 
following the adoption of the important EC Recommendations on directors’ remuneration and on 
the role of non-executive directors in 2004 and 2005, respectively. This overview is largely based 
on the answers to questionnaires sent to legal experts from seventeen European Member States. The 
paper also provides an empirical analysis of governance practices and, in particular, firm disclosure 
of directors’ remuneration in Europe’s largest 300 listed firms by market capitalisation. The paper 
reveals that, notwithstanding a swathe of reforms across the Member States in recent years and 
related harmonisation efforts, disclosure levels still vary from country to country and are strongly 
dependent on the existence of regulations and best practice guidelines in the firm’s home Member 
State. Convergence in disclosure practices is not strong; only a  few basic standards are followed by 
the majority of the firms examined and there is strong divergence with respect to most of the criteria 
considered in the study. Consistent with previous research, our study reveals clear differences not 
only with respect to remuneration disclosure, but also with respect to shareholder engagement and 
the board’s role in the remuneration process and in setting remuneration guidelines. Ownership 
structures still ‘matter’; these divergences tend to follow different corporate governance systems 
and, in particular, the dispersed ownership/block-holding ownership divide. They do not appear to 
have been smoothed since the EC Company Law Action Plan was launched and notwithstanding the 
harmonisation that has been attempted in this field. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Few other issues have generated as much interest in the corporate governance field in the 
past decade as executive remuneration. Major corporate scandals internationally, such as Enron, 
Worldcom, Ahold, Vivendi, and Skandia, were associated with flawed executive pay structures and 
the related generation of perverse management incentives.
1 The focus on executive remuneration 
has since sharpened further with the 2007-2009 financial crisis, as flawed executive pay structures 
have been linked to excessive risk-taking by banks and financial institutions.
2  Shareholder and 
stakeholder interest in executive remuneration has remained acute in recent years and persisted after 
the intense focus of the Enron-era.
3 Remuneration structures have also evolved,  reflecting the wider 
dynamism  of  corporate  governance  but  also  the  perceived  centrality  of  remuneration  to  strong 
corporate performance. Boards constantly re-evaluate their firms’ remuneration structures in order 
to respond to changes in their operations and to evolving best practices in their home markets and 
beyond.  This  focus  is  rational;  executive  remuneration  structures  can  provide  a  powerful 
mechanism for managing the risks which arise from the separation of ownership and control in 
large firms.
4 Agency theory suggests that the performance-based remuneration contract, which links 
pay to shareholder wealth via performance indicators such as share prices and accounting-based 
targets, is a powerful way of attracting, retaining and motivating managers to reflect shareholders’ 
interests. This is particularly the case in dispersed ownership corporate structures where agency 
costs  can  be  high  and  where  different  instruments,  including  performance-related  remuneration 
                                                            
1 See: J.C. Coffee (2006 ), A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the US and Europe Differ; P. Davies, Enron and 
Corporate Governance Reform in the UK and the European Community; S. Deakin and S. J. Konzelmann, Corporate 
Governance after Enron: An Age of Enlightenment, in J. Armour and J. A. McCahery (eds.), “After Enron: Improving 
Corporate  Law  and  Modernising  Securities  Regulation  in  Europe  and  the  US”, Oxford:  Hart  Publications;  J.  Hill 
(2006), Regulating Executive Remuneration: International Developments in the Post-Scandal Era, European Company 
Law, Vol. 3, p. 64. 
2 See for example, Financial Services Authority (FSA), The Turner Review. A Regulatory Response to the Global 
Banking Crisis (2009), pp. 79-81. 
3 Shareholder activism on remuneration in the UK increased sharply over the financial crisis and in particular in early 
2009: Editorial: Shareholder duties, Financial Times, 11 May 2009, p. 10. 
4 For an analysis of the executive pay contract in the context of dispersed and block holding systems see G. Ferrarini 
and N. Moloney (2005), Executive Remuneration in the EU: The Context for Reform, 21 Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy,  p. 304. 4 
 
schemes, but also monitoring by outside directors and reviewing by independent auditors, may 
mitigate agency costs and risks.  
  The debate on executive remuneration is multi-faceted. Extensive analysis has, for example, 
been carried out on the optimal pay structure for aligning pay with performance in order to reduce 
agency  costs.  Reflecting  the  assumption  of  much  of  the  ‘law  and  finance’  literature  that  ‘law 
matters’, executive remuneration has also recently become characterised as a regulatory issue, with 
flaws in executive remuneration structures being linked to insufficient regulation. Remuneration has 
also become a public policy issue and regarded as a target for legislation,
  5 as public outrage,  
particularly over the financial crisis and with respect to ‘rewards for failure, has led to pressure for 
visible action and retribution.
6 The risks of executive remuneration accordingly now extend beyond 
the corporate decision-making sphere and are squarely within the regulatory and legislative sphere, 
and so include the many risks associated with regulatory intervention. 
The debate is also multi-jurisdictional, reflecting the changing dynamics of remuneration, 
regulation and corporate efficiency in different governance systems. The European Union (EU), in 
particular, provides a richly fertile ground for the directors’ remuneration debate.
7  
This  paper  places  the  remuneration  debate  in  a  post-Enron,  EU  regulatory  context  and 
considers the impact of the corporate governance reforms in the 2003 Company Law Action Plan. It 
also provides an empirical analysis of the governance structures which apply to the determination of 
                                                            
5 R. Posner (2009), Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, If So, What if Anything Should Be Done About It?, 58 Duke L.J. 
1013, 2009. 
6 Well-illustrated by the UK experience and widespread public hostility to the pension payments made to RBS ex-chief 
execution Fred Goodwin. But public hostility at payments to leaders of failed institutions has been widespread, although 
the US and British public remain more sympathetic, by contrast with their continental counterparts, to bonus-based 
payment in principle: R. Milne, Sharp divide in public opinion on bonus culture, Financial Times, 14 April 2009, 6.  
7 For previous studies on executive remuneration and respective EU reforms see the following: G. Ferrarini and N. 
Moloney  (2004),  Executive  Remuneration  and  Corporate  Governance  in  the  EU:  Convergence,  Divergence,  and 
Reform Perspectives, in Ferrarini, Hopt, Winter, Wymeersch (Eds.), Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe, 
Oxford University Press, p. 267; G. Ferrarini, N. Moloney, C. Vespro (2004), Executive Pay: Convergence in Law and 
Practice  Across  the  EU  Corporate  Governance  Faultline,  in  Journal  of  Corporate  Law  Studies,  Hart  Publishing, 
Cambridge  (UK),  p.  243;  G.  Ferrarini,  N.  Moloney  and  C.  Vespro  (2003),  Executive  Remuneration  in  the  EU: 
Comparative Law and Practice, ECGI Law Working Paper 09/2003; Ferrarini and Moloney, supra note 4.  5 
 
remuneration  in  European  firms,  particularly  with  respect  to  firms'  disclosure  of  remuneration 
policy and practices just before the financial crisis.
8  
As  we  show  in  this  paper,  different  types  of  crisis  provoke  different  reactions  to 
remuneration  and  generate  different  perspectives  on  the  remuneration  design  debate.  The 
technology bubble in the latter half of the 1990s  was a consequence of a speculative era which was 
also reflected in the approach adopted to executive remuneration over that period.
9 The corporate 
scandals  that  occurred  during  the  2001-2003  ‘Enron-era’  saw  share  option  pay,  in  particular, 
become associated with the distortion of management incentives and with the related manipulation 
of financial disclosure. The Enron-era also led to calls for better alignment between management 
interests and shareholder interests through executive remuneration structures and, in particular, to 
support for high-powered and long-term incentives in the form of equity-based pay. The debate did 
not, for the most part, however, focus on remuneration policy generally; the characterisation of 
executive  remuneration  as  a  device  for  minimising  agency  costs  to  shareholders  and  aligning 
management and shareholder interests remained the dominant one. Following the 2007-2009 crisis, 
however, stronger legislative intervention in the remuneration area is being advocated in order to 
achieve better alignment of remuneration with risk-taking by financial institutions and to support 
increased  stakeholder  engagement.  In  particular,  the  emerging  ‘stakeholder  value’  analysis  of 
remuneration is expanding the range of interests to which remuneration should align management 
interests to include counterparties, auditors, analysts, customers and the public interest in financial 
stability. The stakeholder analysis is also being expressly advocated by the European Commission 
with  the  two  Commission  Recommendations  on  remuneration  following  the  financial  crisis 
advocating ‘stakeholder’ rather than simply ‘shareholder’ monitoring of the remuneration process. 
For  example,  the  Commission  has  affirmed  that  both  its  2009  Recommendations  are  “without 
                                                            
8  When  using  the  term  ‘director’,  we  follow  the  Commission’s  definition  of  the  director  as  “any  member  of  the 
administrative,  managerial  or  supervisory  bodies  of  a  listed  company”:  see  2004/913/EC,  Art.  2.1.  We  refer  to 
‘regulation’ as the mix of public regulation, recommendations and best practice codes.  
9 P. Bolton, J. Scheinkman and W. Xiong (2005), Pay for Short-Term Performance: Executive Compensation in 
Speculative Markets, ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 79/2005, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=691142. 6 
 
prejudice to the rights, where applicable, of social partners in collective bargaining”. In particular, 
the Recommendation on remuneration in the financial services sector underlines the importance of 
compliance with standards governing the relationship with interested parties, such as clients. 
The  need  for  firms  to  focus  on  long-term  rather  than  on  short-term  performance  is  a 
recurring theme of the reform movement, whilst the new swathe of reforms similarly emphasises 
the  need  for  remuneration  to  be  symmetric  with  effective  risk  management.  The  remuneration 
model which led to the financial crises caused perverse incentives that amplified excessive risk-
taking, which, in the end, threatened the global markets. The emerging remuneration model is likely 
to include incentives which encourage better risk management and penalise failure. But there is also 
a strong public concern that, to be optimal, pay should also be ‘fair’. But here intervention becomes 
risk-laden and difficulties with contractual rights arise. Establishing rules or guidelines on optimal 
pay, which also respond to public concerns with respect to fairness, is not an easy task. It is even 
more difficult on the European stage. 
Our  research  shows  that  transposition  of  the  less  ambitious  2004  and  2005 
Recommendations into Member States’ regimes has been achieved only in part. Additionally, and 
consistent with previous research,
10 our study reveals clear divergences between countries in their 
requirements with respect to remuneration disclosure, shareholder engagement, board’s role in the 
remuneration process and pay guidelines. These divergences are in line with different corporate 
governance systems and appear not to have been smoothed since the Commission’s Company Law 
Action Plan was launched.  
Although  the  influence  of  corporate  governance  regimes  is  marked,  the  persistent 
divergences    may  also  be  in  part  related  to  how  the  Commission  approached  harmonisation.  
In its first wave of reforms in  2004-2005, the Commission opted for a self-regulatory, market-
based approach, based on non-binding Recommendations, thereby respecting differences in national 
traditions.  In  practice,  most  of  the  Recommendations’  provisions  have  been  transposed  on  the 
                                                            
10 See Ferrarini and Moloney, supra note 4 and 7; Ferrarini et al., supra note 7. 7 
 
‘comply  or  explain’  basis  rather  than  through  public  legislation.  As  a  result,  convergence  of 
regulations  on  board  practices,  disclosure  and  shareholder  participation  in  the  directors’ 
remuneration process is far from being achieved. Notwithstanding the limited success of the earlier 
Recommendations,  however,  a  new  wave  of  reforms  has  been  launched  with  the  2009 
Recommendations,  which  make  provision  for    an  increased  role  for  the  board  in  remuneration 
governance,  address  clawbacks  and  ‘golden  parachutes’  and  the  adjustment  of  remuneration  to 
effective  risk  management.  More  harmonisation  and  greater  regulatory  intervention  in  the 
remuneration process is also envisaged. But experience with the first wave of reforms makes their 
success questionable. 
Our research on the degree of conformity of European firms with the Commission’s 2004 
and  2005  Recommendations  and  with  international  best  practices  reveals,  in  particular,  that 
disclosure of directors’ remuneration, central to effective monitoring of remuneration, varies from 
country to country. Disclosure practices appear to be strongly dependent on local rules and best 
practice guidelines in home Member States. Only a few core requirements are followed by the 
majority of firms; for the most, the pattern is one of divergence with respect to the different criteria 
considered in this study. Firms tend to place the highest importance on basic requirements, such as 
the existence of the remuneration committee, the adoption of a remuneration policy and individual 
disclosure of emoluments; requirements for more detailed disclosure with respect to directors’ terms 
of contracts and qualitative information regarding performance-linked remuneration have generated 
lower interest from firms. Boiler-plate disclosures, of limited use in practice, are common in firm 
disclosure. But the effective assessment of remuneration by key stakeholders requires adequate and 
effective  disclosure  on  the  remuneration  contract.  Although  disclosure  has  somewhat  improved 
following  the  2004-2005  EC  Recommendations,  a  clear  and  comprehensive  overview  of 
companies’ remuneration has not been achieved. This prejudices effective remuneration governance 
and  obstructs  effective  assessment  of  the  remuneration  system  adopted  by  firms.  Overall,  the 
Recommendations have not led to a proper understanding of remuneration structures in European 8 
 
companies. Given the increased complexity of remuneration structures, understanding, in practice, 
has weakened.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 highlights how appropriate governance can 
drive  more  efficient  remuneration structures  and  how  the  related regulatory  reform  agenda  has 
developed in recent years in the EU. Section 3 provides an overview of the EU’s harmonisation 
efforts (namely the Commission’s Recommendations on the role of non-executive director and on 
directors’ remuneration) and of local responses at Member State level. Our analysis of Member 
State regulation of directors’ remuneration is based in large part on the answers to questionnaires 
sent to legal experts in seventeen European Member States. Section 4 examines European firms’ 
remuneration  governance  and  disclosure  practices,  as  evidenced  by  the  disclosure  provided  by 
Europe’s largest 300 listed firms by market capitalisation with reference to 2007. The last Section 
concludes and suggests reform proposals. 
 
2. DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION FRAMEWORK  
 
2.1 Pay alignments 
In principle, levels of executive remuneration seem inexplicable. In 2005, average total US 
CEO annual pay was $2,164,952, comprised of approximately 27% base salary and 62% variable 
pay (largely composed of long-term incentives). In 2007 the median pay of CEOs of S&P 500 
companies was $8.8 million.
11 In Europe, levels of pay were somewhat lower, but variable elements 
were also predominant; the median CEO total salary in 2007 was €5,020,000, with a median base 
salary of 1,300,000.
12 However troubling levels of pay may be, performance-based bonuses and 
long-term incentives typically form the main part of executives’ remuneration. But is variable pay 
of this kind aligned with the performance measures on which it is notionally based? The optimal 
                                                            
11  R.  Thomas  (2008),  International  Executive  Pay:  Current  Practices  and  Future  Trends,  Vanderbilt  Law  and 
Economics Research Paper No. 08-26, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1265122. 
12 See study done by Hay Group, How Chief Executives are paid, January 2008. 9 
 
design of executive remuneration and its alignment to corporate performance was traditionally an 
issue for boards and shareholders, and so a function of their characterisation of the determinants of 
strong corporate performance, typically profits and growth, and of the ability of these performance 
indicators to align remuneration efficiently. This is now changing. Although the Enron-era saw a 
sharper focus on the link between flawed executive pay structures and wider market efficiency, the 
2007-2009 financial crisis has seen executive remuneration move from the shareholder agenda and 
become  associated  with  wider  financial  market  stability  and  a  concern  for  a  wide  stakeholder 
community,  including  regulators,  investors  and  the  public  generally.  In  particular,  the  risks  of 
flawed  remuneration  structures  have  become  associated  with  the  catastrophic  failure  of  market 
discipline implicated in the crisis. The traditional primacy of the shareholder interest in executive 
remuneration  and  the  link  between  remuneration  and  profits/growth,  however  flawed  in  its 
execution, is therefore being challenged by a wider stakeholder interest as the systemic risks from 
poor remuneration structures within banks in particular have become clearer.  
The crisis has also seen the traditional view that high levels of remuneration are justified as 
long as remuneration aligns shareholder and management interests effectively come under threat. It 
appears that public opinion on remuneration levels changes with different economic cycles. In their 
provocative book, Bebchuk and Fried suggest that any levels of compensation would be acceptable 
as long as the “incentives effects actually serve shareholders”.
13 But Gordon has  suggested that the 
executive remuneration debate takes place in two forums: one focuses on maximising shareholder 
value; the other focuses on the social implications of wealth and power.
14 Reflecting the latter 
dynamic, the 2007-2009 financial crisis has led to widespread public hostility to the notion that high 
levels of remuneration are justifiable.
15 The executive remuneration question has evolved from a 
concern as to how to achieve optimal pay structures that reward performance into a concern as to 
                                                            
13 L. Bebchuk and J. Fried, “Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation”, Harvard 
University Press. 
14 J. Gordon (2005), Executive Compensation: If There’s a Problem, What’s the Remedy? The Case for Compensation 
Disclosure and Analysis, Journal of Corporation Law. 
15 Milne, supra note 6. 10 
 
whether pay structures are ‘just’ and, in particular, do not reward failure.
16  As noted above, the 
remuneration  debate  is  also  being  linked  to  the  achievement  of  wider  stakeholder  objectives, 
particularly with respect to systemic stability.
17 Similarly, the wider stakeholder value debate is also 
impacting on the remuneration debate; other stakeholders such as employers, customers, auditors, 
analysts, and the public at large are regarded as having an interest in firms’ remuneration policy and 
are being empowered to assess independently the economic and financial status of the firm. 
Whatever the performance indicators which are at stake and whether they are shareholder or 
stakeholder driven, both short-term and long-term incentives seem poorly designed for the purpose 
of connecting remuneration and performance. It is now clear that executive remuneration has not 
closely  followed  company  performance;  remuneration  packages  seem  to  buck  wider  economic 
trends. For example, the most recent studies covering the period when the financial crisis began to 
emerge show that CEO compensation in S&P 500 companies was approximately USD 8.4 million 
in 2007 and did not reduce in 2008 when the economy was weakening.
18 More generally, executive 
compensation has increased steadily, as firms have increased in size, in the past three decades. 
Gabaix and Landier indicate that the average CEO total compensation and firm size have increased 
six times between 1980 and 2003.
19 This sharp increase in executive compensation has led to a 
strong public sentiment that CEOs are overly compensated for firm performance that is largely 
related to wider economic factors. The increase in CEO compensation is also seen as linked to the 
increase in CEO power.
20 
                                                            
16 Although the Turner Review was careful to distinguish between the debate on levels of remuneration, which it did not 
regard as its concern, and the debate on appropriate incentive alignment with respect to stability, which was its concern. 
17 For example, the FSA is considering the adoption of a Code on executive remuneration which would have rule status 
for systemically important institutions: Turner Review, p. 80, supra note 2. 
18 Understood as average total pay. This is mainly evidenced at banks. See OECD, Corporate Governance Lessons from 
the  Financial  Crisis,  2009;  the  Associated  Press  study  at 
http://www.shareholderforum.com/sop/Library/20080919_Deal.htm. 
19 X. Gabaix (2008) and A. Landier, Why has CEO pay increased so much?, Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, 49-
100. 
20  See  L.  Bebchuk  and  J.  Fried  (2003),  Executive  Compensation  as  an  Agency  Problem,  Journal  of  Economic 
Perspectives, vol. 17, pp. 71-92; L. Bebchuk, J. Fried and D. Walker (2002), Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in 
the Design of Executive Compensation, University of Chicago Law Review 69, 751-846; Posner, supra note 5; L. 
Bebchuk and J. Fried (2003), Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 11 
 
2.2 Remuneration governance 
A range of factors seem to combine to produce faulty remuneration design. Prior to the 
financial crisis, the literature focused on the ‘missing link’ between remuneration and corporate 
performance  and  highlighted  governance  failures  in  how  remuneration  was  determined.
21  The  
2007-2009 crisis has also revealed poor ‘remuneration governance’ as a main contributor to the 
failure  of  remuneration  structures  to  capture  excessive  risk-taking    allowing  design  failures  to 
emerge through conflicted pay-setting processes and disclosure failures.
22 
‘Remuneration governance’ has a number of elements including disclosure of remuneration, 
board monitoring of remuneration structures (particularly by independent directors) and shareholder 
voice (or the controversial ‘say on pay’ mechanism). These elements are interlinked. Corporate 
governance codes typically affirm that one of the board’s central responsibilities is to align key 
executive and board remuneration packages with the long-term interests of the company and its 
shareholders.
23 But comprehensive disclosure supports stronger board monitoring by strengthening 
the  board’s  ability  to  withstand  managerial  pressure  and,  through  reputational  and  publicity 
dynamics,  stimulating  shareholder  and  public  reaction  which  can  lend  further  legitimacy  to  a 
board’s position and enhance the public perception of the social value of remuneration.
24 ‘Say on 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
17, pp. 71-92; L. Bebchuk, J. Fried and D. Walker (2002), Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of 
Executive Compensation, University of Chicago Law Review 69, 751-846. 
21 See for example Coffee Jr. and John C. (2005) A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the U.S. and Europe Differ, 
Oxford  Review  of  Economic  Policy,  21(2),  p.  198–211;  Coffee  Jr.  (2003),  Gatekeeper  Failure  and  Reform:  The 
Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 237; J.E. Core, R.G. 
Wayne and R. Thomas (2004), Is US CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance, Vanderbilt Law and 
Economics Research Paper No. 05-05; U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper 05-13; L. Enriques and P. F. 
Volpin (2007), Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 21, No. 
1, pp. 117-140, G. Ferrarini and P. Giudici, (2005) Financial Scandals and the Role of Private Enforcement: The 
Parmalat  Case,  in  Armour,  McCahery  (Eds.),  “After  Enron”,  Hart  Publisher,  2006,  p.  159.;  J.  Hill,  Regulating 
Executive Remuneration: International Developments in the Post-Scandal Era, European Company Law, Vol. 3, p. 64, 
2006; B. Holmstrom (2005), Pay without Performance and the Managerial Power Hypothesis: A Comment, Journal of 
Corporation Law, 30(4) 703-713. 
22 Report by High-Level Group of Financial Supervision in the EU, chaired by Jacque de Larosière, February 2009;  
The Turner Review, supra note 2; Viral A. and M. Richardson (Eds.) (2009), Restoring Financial Stability: How to 
Repair a Failed System, NYU Stern.   
23 See OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004, Principle VI.D.4; see also corporate codes of EU Member 
States, available at ECGI website, http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php.  
24 See analysis of executive remuneration remedies by Gordon, supra note 14. 12 
 
pay’ mechanisms are similarly of limited value unless they are coupled with extensive and effective 
disclosure.  
The  intuition  that  strong  remuneration  governance  should  lead  to  more  effective 
remuneration structures and to a better alignment of director and shareholder interests is reflected in 
the evidence that firms with sound remuneration governance structures are more compliant with 
other governance principles, as compared to firms that appear to be in compliance as a matter of 
form but are not compliant as a matter of substance.
25 It is also reflected, more generally, in the 
emerging, if controversial, evidence (based on assessments of firm-level corporate governance in 
different countries) that sound corporate governance is related to firm value. Some studies suggest a 
positive relationship between corporate governance practices and growth.
26 But the link between 
corporate governance practices and growth is not entirely clear.  There is evidence to suggest that 
there  might  not  be  a  relationship  between  firms’  corporate  governance  practices  and  their 
performance.
27 It has also been suggested that firm value depends on country-level shareholder 
protection laws as well as on firm-level corporate governance attributes
28. On the other hand, the 
costs related to the implementation of corporate governance mechanisms seem to be lower than the 
monitoring benefits which result in higher cash flows accruing to investors and lower costs of 
capital for firms.
29 Accordingly, firms should understand the importance of different elements of 
sound  corporate  governance  and,  particularly,  the  determinants  of  effective  remuneration 
                                                            
25 Referring to financial firms, which can be extended to all industries: Financial Stability Forum, FSF Principles for 
Sound Compensation Practices, April, 2009. 
26 See M. Ammann, D. Oesch and M. Schmid (2009), Corporate Governance and Firm Value: International Evidence, 
Swiss  Institute  of  Banking  and  Finance,  University  of  St.  Gallen;  R.  Aggarwal  and  R.  Williamson,  Did  New 
Regulations Target the Relevant Corporate Governance Attributes?, Working Paper, Georgetown University; available 
at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=891411; V. Bruno and S. Claessens, Corporate Governance and 
Regulation: Can There be Too Much of a Good Thing?, ECGI Finance Working Paper No. 142/2007 and World Bank 
Policy  Research  Working  Paper,  available  at:  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=956329;  V. 
Chhaochharia and L. Laeven (2007), Corporate Governance, Norms and Practices, ECGI Finance Working Paper No. 
165/2007, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=965733. 
27 For example N. Fernandes (2005), Board Compensation and Firm Performance: The Role of “Independent” Board 
Members, ECGI Finance Working Paper No. 104/2005; L.D. Brown, and M.L. Caylor, (2008), Corporate Governance 
and Firm Operating Performance, Rev Quant Finan Acc (2009) 32:129–144; S. Bhagat, B. Bolton and R. Romano, The 
Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices (2007), ECGI Law Working Paper No. 89/2007, Yale Law & 
Economics Research Paper No. 367, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1019921. 
28 Bruno and Claessens, supra note 26. 
29 Ammann et al., supra note 26. 13 
 
governance, and regard effective remuneration governance  as  an opportunity rather than as an 
obligation which imposes costs.  
But it is also clear that remuneration governance has not been effective. As outlined above, 
boards  appear  to  have  failed  in  aligning  remuneration  to  performance,  whether  in  terms  of 
traditional growth/profit determinants or in terms of wider stakeholder interests. Either regulation 
has been weak, its application ‘in action’ has been flawed, or there have been failures on both 
counts.  But  it  could  also  be  that  the  assumption  that,  in  principle,  performance-based  variable 
remuneration delivers stronger shareholder value, which has underpinned the remuneration debate, 
is neither a robust assumption for understanding executive remuneration or on which remedies can 
be based, given the extent to which performance-based remunerations structures can be manipulated 
to deliver excessive payments to directors (as outlined further below).
30 A series of global corporate 
scandals have repeatedly revealed serious flaws in remuneration practices and raised questions as to 
remuneration governance and, in particular, the efficiency of the board.  
Governance reform has been central to the EU’s remuneration agenda. The EC Treaty grants 
competence to the institutions to act in the corporate governance sphere, affirming that economies 
only work if companies are run efficiently and transparently and are sensitive to concerns of their 
shareholders  and,  where  relevant,  of  their  stakeholders.
31  The  EU’s  response  to  the  various 
corporate  scandals  and  to  the  repeated  failure  of  pay  to  align  interests  has  been  to  focus  on 
governance. It has promoted best practices and  supported greater convergence through a mix of 
binding and non-binding governance measures which respect the diversity of the different corporate 
governance systems within the EU as well as ongoing changes in market practices. The design of 
executive remuneration was not, however, a concern of the EU prior to the financial crisis, although 
this  position  has  since  changed.  The  ‘Enron-era’/Company  Law  Action  Plan  reforms  focused 
                                                            
30 See several critiques to Bebchuk and Fried book “The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation”, which 
argues that the compensation levels are best explained by managerial rent-seeking: J. Gordon, supra note 14; Bolton et 
al., supra note 9; Ferrarini, G., Grande paghe, piccoli risultati: “rendite” dei managers e possibili rimedi (a proposito 
di un libro recente) (Italian), Rivista della Società, N.4. 
31 Article 44(2) of the EC Treaty. 14 
 
instead  on  improving  remuneration  disclosure  and  on  ensuring  the  independence  of  the 
remuneration process. The details of the EU regime and its application into national regulations and 
practices are analysed in Section 3 and 4 of this paper. 
 
Disclosure 
Disclosure is central to the adoption of effective remuneration contracts in the EU. As well 
as improving monitoring (as discussed below), disclosure  can respond to the particular agency 
costs of executive pay across both dispersed and blockholding systems and so minimize regulatory 
intervention in governance choices and structures.
32  
If investors are to be able to assess remuneration relative to performance, boards, as a matter 
of  good  practice,  should  produce  and  disclose  a  remuneration  policy  statement  covering  board 
members and key executives, explaining the relationship between remuneration and performance 
and including measurable standards that emphasise the long-term interests of the company. In the 
wake of the financial crisis, it is also clear that firms should also demonstrate to regulators and their 
other  stakeholders  that  their  compensation  policies  are  sound,  thereby  facilitating  constructive 
engagement with stakeholders and, in particular, diluting potentially unhelpful ‘outrage’ effects. 
But disclosure policy must be nuanced and effective; disclosure must be ‘processable’
33 and 
relevant. Enhancing disclosure does not simply mean providing more details about remuneration 
packages. Remuneration disclosure must be published in a clear and exhaustive manner and allow 
for easy assessment of the performance link and, ideally, easy industry comparison. Most analysis 
supports the view that the UK and US disclosure systems provide the most complete accounts of 
directors’ remuneration, by requiring separate remuneration reports that include all elements of 
remuneration governance as well as details on remuneration packages. Although disclosure policy 
                                                            
32 Ferrarini and Moloney, supra note 4. 
33  For  example  J.  Cox.  and  J.  Payne  (2005),    Mutual  Fund  Expense  Disclosures:  A  Behavioural  Perspective,  83 
Washington University Law Quarterly 907. 15 
 
must be carefully managed to avoid the risks associated with disclosure,
34 the benefits of effective 
disclosure are potentially considerable; it can support stronger shareholder monitoring, better board 
discipline, mitigate the risks of board capture and of remuneration becoming an occasion for looting 
by directors (as outlined below), and increase  board accountability to the shareholders.  
 
Board Independence 
The effectiveness of executive remuneration is also related to board independence.
35 The 
remuneration contract is typically regarded as a remedy for the agency costs of dispersed ownership 
and it may also protect minority shareholders against abuses of power by controlling shareholders  
in  blockholding  governance.
36  But  executive  remuneration  can  also  be  regarded  as  generating 
agency costs in that the setting of executive remuneration provides conflicted directors with an 
opaque device for extracting benefits from the firm. A conflicted board may use the pay-setting 
process to influence remuneration to the detriment of the shareholders by, for example, adopting 
weak performance targets, awarding share option packages which reward wider market gains and 
resetting performance targets where they are not met.
37 Boards may become conflicted in a number 
of well-documented ways;
38 a dominant CEO, for example, can prejudice the independence of the 
remuneration process (as well as the appointment of robust and independent-minded non-executive 
directors), while the absence of shareholder influence in the director selection and compensation 
process generally also undermines board independence
39. Corporate scandals are often examined in 
term of boards’ failure to fulfill their role as independent monitors of the remuneration process.  
                                                            
34 Downside effects have also been expressed: see for example Gordon, supra note 14. Additional disclosure may 
contribute to escalation of executive compensation because of increased transparency. 
35 See extensive analysis of independent directors in Gordon, J. (2007), The Rise of Independent Directors in the United 
States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 59, No 6.    
36 See further Ferrarini and Moloney, supra note 4. 
37 For further analysis of the executive pay and agency model see Ferrarini and Moloney, supra note 4. 
38 See further Ferrarini et al., supra note 7. 
39 See Bebchuk comments on corporate elections: L. Bebchuk (2005), The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 
Harvard Law Review,  Vol. 118,  No.  3, pp. 833-914, January  2005   (Previously  titled  The  Case  for  Empowering 
Shareholders). 16 
 
In mitigation, the  monitoring role of the independent non-executive director is typically 
viewed as essential in areas that are vulnerable to conflict of interest risk, including the nomination 
of directors and audit, but also remuneration. The independent director has a role to play in both 
dispersed and blockholding systems. In dispersed ownership systems, shareholders are unable to 
monitor  management  closely.  Non-executive  directors,  however,  can  close  the  information  and 
monitoring gap to which shareholders are exposed. But this depends on the independence of the 
non-executive  directors  from  the  executive  board.  In  blockholding  companies,  controlling 
shareholders have the power to monitor and influence management as they have easier access to 
information and strong ties to the board. But minority shareholders can be protected and conflicts of 
interest  can  be  avoided  by  non-executive  directors  who  are  independent  from  the  controlling 
shareholders.  
 Regulation  in  this  area  therefore  typically  seeks  to  ensure  sufficient  director 
independence,
40 although there is some evidence the board independence is not related to the long 
term performance of a firm.
41 
 
‘Say on Pay’ and Shareholder Voice 
The remuneration governance matrix also includes shareholder voice and the engagement of 
shareholders  in  the  pay-setting  process.  The  ‘say  on  pay’  mechanism,  supported  by  effective 
disclosure, might be regarded as fundamental to effective remuneration governance, although it is 
of widely varying importance across Europe. Remuneration is currently a ‘hot topic’ at general 
meetings; what has been described as a ‘spreading shareholder revolt’ on remuneration is currently 
underway in the UK,
42 primed by co-ordinated institutional investor activism. But shareholders’ 
                                                            
40 Sometimes “sufficient” is understood as “full” independence. In Section 3 we explain the different approaches in 
various Member State regulation. 
41 For example, Bhagat et al., supra note 27; B. Bhagat and B. Black (2002), The Non-Correlation Between Board 
Independence and Long Term Firm Performance, Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 27, p. 231-273. 
42 K. Burgess and J. Croft, Provident bonuses shot down by shareholders, Financial Times 7 January 2007 p.21. 
Shareholders have either voted against remuneration policies, or shown large dissenting minorities, in a number of high-17 
 
rights to monitor remuneration policy or to participate in its design differ across Europe, reflecting 
different  ownership  structures  and  the  diverging  role  of  the  general  meeting.  In  blockholding 
systems, the presence of controlling shareholders may reduce the importance of a vote, given their 
implicit influence upon the board and their primary interest in extracting rents; of course, in theory, 
shareholder votes on board strategies, including remuneration policy, is nonetheless considered a 
best practice mechanism for protecting minority shareholders. There may also be wider resistance to 
a ‘say on pay’ by other interest groups. In Germany, for example, where current employees may 
serve as members of the supervisory board, employee unions typically do not support a shareholder 
‘say on pay’ as this would reduce their power in the supervisory board. And although shareholder 
voice is more usually associated with dispersed ownership, collective influence “behind the scenes” 
in these companies could also diminish the importance of the actual vote
43. Nonetheless, recent UK 
corporate practice suggests enthusiastic reliance on the shareholder remuneration vote.  
The impact of shareholder votes on remuneration policies is not as yet clear, particularly 
where the vote is advisory only. Nevertheless, a connection in principle between shareholders and 
corporate remuneration policy is, at least, created where the mechanism exists.
44 Whether advisory 
or binding, a shareholder vote on the remuneration policy can have significant influence upon the 
board, as long as it is compulsory. For example, the UK vote was introduced by law in 2002
45 and 
is advisory, insofar as payments made or promised to directors do not have to be repaid in the event 
that the ordinary resolution on remuneration (requiring a 50 per cent majority of those voting) is not 
passed.
46 However, the failure to obtain approval effectively amounts to a vote of ‘no confidence’ in 
the  remuneration  committee,  is  regarded  as  a  significant  blow  to  the  board’s  authority  and  is 
typically  widely  reported.  Companies  facing  a  negative  vote  usually  have  good  warning  of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
profile UK companies including Provident Financial, TRG and BP, with some predicting that ‘no’ votes will become 
more common: K. Burgess, Shareholders to adopt tougher stance, Financial Times, 7 May 2009, p. 23.  
43 B. Cheffins and R. Thomas (2001), Should Shareholders Have a Greater Say Over Executive Pay? Learning from the 
US Experience, Journal of Corporate Law Studies 1: 277-315.   
44 For an analysis of the ‘say on pay’ effects see Gordon, J. (2008), Say-on-Pay: Cautionary Notes on the UK 
Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 117/2009, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1262867. 
45 Companies Act 2006 s. 439. 
46 In case of a negative vote, payments made or promised to directors would not have to be repaid.  18 
 
impending  problems  –  for  example,  via  press  and  shareholder  comment  and  flagging  by 
representatives of institutional investors (such as the Association of British Insurers) and/or proxy 
voting.  On  the  other  hand,  thorough  engagement  by  remuneration  committee  members  with 
institutional shareholders once a problem has arisen often enables a negative vote to be avoided. In 
this way remuneration committees, by means of the potential effects of the ‘say on pay,’ have more 
power in setting the remuneration of executives and in facing down hostile boards and remuneration 
governance is strengthened. Where the committees are also assisted by external advice, they have 
greater ability to negotiate with influential shareholders, as long as remuneration consultants are not 
already captured by the firm.  
But  the  picture  is  blurred.  Shareholder  votes  may  become  a  hostage  to  populism. 
Shareholders in every Member State are entitled to vote on share schemes such as stock options or 
free grants of shares.
47 But this has not improved remuneration design: general opinion turned 
against equity and option-based compensation after the corporate accounting scandals came into 
light and, more recently, after the financial crisis began in 2007. This is not surprising given that 
executive  compensation  has  a  history  of  being  targeted  by  populist  attacks  following  market 
declines and scandals. But it may obstruct the ability of boards to adopt effective remuneration 
structures where shareholders are sensitive to the vagaries of public opinion.
48   
The dynamics of  shareholder voice in practice are also more complex than a voting right 
might suggest. Some companies have gone beyond legal requirements in seeking shareholder input 
on their pay practices.
49 Institutional shareholders are also privileged in their access to boards’ 
                                                            
47 The origin of this rule was in the protection of shareholders against dilution of capital. Now the scope of the rule is 
broader and its rationale different, including and not limited to issues of design, to increase shareholders’ return on 
investment. 
48 S. Bhagat and R. Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 2009; 
Michael  C.  Jensen  and  Kevin  J.  Murphy, Performance Pay  and  Top Management  Incentives,  Journal  of  Political 
Economy  (April,  1990),  pp.  225-265;  reprinted  in  Michael  C.  Jensen,  “Foundations  of  Organizational  Strategy”, 
(Harvard University Press, 1998). 
49 See Wall Street Journal, “Companies Seek Shareholder Input on Pay Practices”, 6 April 2009. In its March 26 proxy, 
Amgen Inc. (US) directed shareholders to a 10-question online survey. Queries included whether the plan is based on 
performance and whether the performance goals were clearly disclosed and understandable. 19 
 
policies. But the core issue remains: from the outside it is difficult to assess whether remuneration is 
‘fair’. 
 
2.3 Reforms 
After the initial round of post-Enron reforms in 2004-2006 (the relevant European reforms 
are discussed in section 3 below), international policy makers engaged in a new round of executive 
remuneration reforms in response to the financial crisis and to the rescue of financial institutions; 
these reforms stand in stark contrast to the earlier reform movement in that, rather than focusing on 
the remuneration/shareholder interests link, they reflect a concern to address excessive risk-taking 
by systemically significant institutions and to align remuneration with ‘sustainable’ or ‘long-term’ 
performance, as well as political pressure to restrict levels of remuneration in failing institutions in 
receipt of tax-payer funds. They also focus on the design of remuneration, particularly the deferral 
of bonuses, to a much greater extent than earlier reforms.  
The US financial rescue legislation contains several provisions directed at restricting the 
compensation of executives in institutions in receipt of government funds.
50 In the UK, the FSA has 
included remuneration in financial institutions in its proposed reforms to the financial system. In 
October 2008, it issued a ’Dear CEO’ letter (to about 20 of the largest UK banks and investment 
firms) which asked CEOs to review their remuneration policies against a set of high-level criteria 
for  good  and  bad  remuneration  policies  for  directors’  remuneration.
51  This  was  followed  in 
February 2009 by a draft Code of Practice on remuneration policies
52 and in March 2009 by a  
Consultation Paper on “Reforming Remuneration Practices in Financial Services”, which set out a 
revised Code of Practice (applying to large banks and investment firms) and in which the FSA 
                                                            
50 "The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009" bill (February, 2009) aims to significantly rewrite the 
original executive compensation and corporate governance provisions of Section 111 of the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008 (12 U.S.C. 5221, "EESA") and will apply to all institutions that have received or will receive 
financial assistance under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”).    
51 FSA, Dear CEO Letter, October 2008: Remuneration Policies.  
52 FSA, Draft Code on Remuneration Practices, March 2009. 20 
 
consulted on its proposal to incorporate the Code into its Handbook, thereby giving it rule status.
53  
The  wide-ranging  Turner  Review  also  highlighted  the  FSA’s  reforms  to  remuneration  within 
financial institutions as part of it efforts to achieve more effective risk management. In October 
2008 the German government approved strict conditions for banks that made use of its rescue 
package, including limits on managers' salaries, bonuses and severance. At the beginning of 2009, 
the French government toughened its approach to remuneration in banks in receipt of public money. 
In return for a €10.5bn tranche of state capital in December 2008, it required them to curb severance 
payments and to offer share options to management only if they were available to all employees; the 
banks have complied with these requirements. In March 2009 the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors (CEBS) published its principles on remuneration policy, which address the key aspects 
of  a  well  functioning  remuneration  policy  and  seek to  support the  sound  operation  of  banking 
institutions. In its Communication to the Spring European Council (“Driving European Recovery”), 
the Commission announced new regulatory reforms in the financial services sector designed to  
improve  risk  management  and  align  pay  incentives  with  sustainable  performance;
54  two  new 
Recommendations on executive remuneration followed (discussed further in section 3 below). One 
strengthens the 2004 and 2005 Recommendations on directors’ remuneration and on the role of the 
non-executive directors;
55 the other addresses remuneration policies in financial institutions.
56 Both 
Recommendations are accompanied by a Commission Communication on remuneration.
57  Earlier 
                                                            
53 FSA, Consultation Paper 09/10, Reforming Remuneration Practices in Financial Services (2009). In the first instance, 
the FSA proposes to apply the code to large banks and authorised investment firms (the Code will therefore apply to 
about 45 institutions) but it may extend the Code to all other FSA-authorised firms. The Consultation Paper suggested 
that ‘although it is hard to prove a direct causal link, there is widespread consensus that remuneration practices may 
have been a contributory factor to the market crisis’  in that they provided incentives for unduly risky practices (p. 3) 
The  Code  (which  includes  rules,  evidential  provisions  and  guidance)  includes  the rule  that  a firm  must  establish, 
implement and maintain remuneration policies, procedures and practices that are consistent with and promote effective 
risk management.  
54 COM(2009) 114. 
55 The 2004 and 2005 Recommendations: EC Recommendation fostering an appropriate regime for the remuneration of 
directors of listed companies (2004/913/EC); EC Recommendation on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors 
of listed companies and on the committees of the (supervisory) board (2005/162/EC); the 2009 Recommendation: 
Commission Recommendation complementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as regards the regime 
for the remuneration of directors of listed companies (C(2009) 3177). 
56 Commission Recommendation on remuneration policies in the financial services sector (C(2009) 3159). 
57 COM (2009) 211. 21 
 
the Financial Services Forum (FSF) agreed on an international code of practice on remuneration 
policies for financial institutions.
58 
Whether or not this increased intensity of intervention will impact on remuneration policies 
remains questionable, particularly given the ambition of the current proposals, and, as discussed in 
section 3, the only limited success of the 2004-2005 reforms. Empirical research on US firms’ 
behaviour indicates that companies often find a way to elude limitations on compensation through 
adjustments to pre-regulation optimal compensation contracts. The result can be higher and more 
opaque  compensation.
59  There  is  little  evidence  of  the  impact  of  regulation  on  European  pay 
practices  as  yet,  as  the  detailed  restrictions  being  placed  on  financial  institutions  are  being 
implemented  at  the  time  of  writing.  The  initial  wave  of  legislation  was  aimed  at  prohibiting 
incentive compensation for executives of financial institutions in financial difficulty and which 
were the main recipients of governments’ funds. But given public sentiment concerning the high 
levels of compensation received by market participants, restrictions on executive compensation may 
extend beyond the financial sector.  
Shareholders  and  boards  of  directors  have  a  common  interest  in  addressing  the  current 
policy and regulatory concerns as to remuneration, in particular  through compliance with  the 
current provisions, as any new legislative intervention is likely to reduce their scope for manoeuvre. 
Nonetheless,  compliance  with  current  remuneration  requirements  and  best  practices  remains 
variable  across  the  Member  States.
60  Despite  current  tensions,  the  UK  market  has  generally 
responded  well  to  the  essentially  self-regulation-based  requirements  which  govern  executive 
remuneration  (primarily  through  the  Combined  Code  on  Corporate  Governance),  with    active 
                                                            
58 FSF principles, supra note 25. 
59 Following US Congress’ restrictions on income tax deductibility of cash compensation to $1 million, US firms 
altered their mix of compensation to reduce cash salaries and increase incentive compensation: T. Perry and M. Zenner 
(2001)  Pay  for  Performance?  Government  Regulation  and  the  Structure  of  Compensation  Contracts,  Journal  of 
Financial Economics, vol. 62, issue 3, p. 453-488. Similarly, after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 required clawbacks 
of incentive-based compensation, US firms increased fixed compensation and decreased incentive compensation: D. 
Cohen et al. (2007), The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Implications for Compensation Structure and Managerial Risk-
Taking, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1027448. 
60 See Section 4 of this paper. 22 
 
discussions  between  companies  and  investors  on  remuneration.
61  Communications  between 
companies and investors have also been enhanced by the introduction of a binding  disclosure 
obligation  concerning  remuneration  disclosure  and  the  mandatory,  if  advisory,  vote  on 
remuneration policy (section 3 below), although relations between investors and companies are 
currently somewhat uneasy. By comparison, the Continental European approach has often been 
criticised  for  poor  compliance  with  best  practice  and  low  levels  of  enforcement  of  legislative 
requirements. Nevertheless, there is concern across the board regarding remuneration at present and 
reforms are likely to be widespread. The differences in approach between the UK and Continental 
Europe will probably become less visible once new rules are in place. Practical evidence also shows 
that differences in compliance with  the Commission’s Recommendations in the Member States are 
related to the ownership structures of the companies – dispersed and blockholding ownership – and 
to the board models.  
But it is difficult to design effective remuneration rules and the scale of the current reform 
project  poses  some  risks,  particularly  given  the  evidence  that  earlier  reforms  have  not  been 
effective.  On  the  other  hand,  it  appears  that  law-makers  and  remuneration  consultants  have 
previously focused too much on linking pay to corporate performance and on aligning remuneration 
with  shareholder interests,  characterised in terms  of  corporate  profits  and  growth.    It  has  been 
argued that the performance-oriented elements of remuneration, designed to align shareholder and 
management interests, distorted incentives as managers focused on achieving specific performance 
targets,  rather  than  on  shareholder  value  generally.
62  Perverse  incentives  also  amplified  the 
excessive  risk-taking  that  threatened  the  global  markets.  This  may,  paradoxically,  have  been 
exacerbated by the long-term performance indicators which have become a feature of the current 
debate; long-term performance, without an acknowledgment of the relevant risks may, in practice, 
have turned directors’ focus towards achieving short-term performance. Downside risks that might 
                                                            
61  For  analysis  of  the  UK  corporate  governance  system,  see  A.  Cadbury  (2002),  “Corporate  Governance  and 
Chairmanship”, Oxford University Press. 
62 B. Cheffins (2009), Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown?  The Case of the 
S&P 500, ECGI Law Working Paper, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1396126. 23 
 
have been realised later were not as relevant to directors.
63 Nor were the exogenous factors driving 
firms’ performance. Remuneration policy also failed to penalise directors for failures; firms’ losses 
were borne entirely by the firms, its shareholders and society, and not by the directors. Some firms 
have since introduced bespoke compensation contracts.
64 While these aim to reduce incentives for 
taking short-term risks, they represent “crisis” measures and do not seem to set the trend for more 
accountable,  forward-looking  remuneration  policies.  Individual  institutions  cannot  change  their 
systems  of  remuneration  on  their  own,  as  they  face  the  risk  of  losing  talented  staff  to  the 
competition. So regulators may have to step in, and the risks of the reform project may be worth 
taking, given the weaknesses of the current approach. 
Certainly, intervention may be much more aggressive under the current reform movement. 
The post-crisis debate on remuneration has not only assessed the link between remuneration and 
performance, it  has also suggested that remuneration design must seek to achieve an appropriate 
balance between risk appetite and risk controls, and between individual or local business unit goals 
and firm-wide objectives.
65 A variety of reforms are being canvassed. The Basel Committee, for 
example, has suggested that risk-adjusted remuneration could be addressed by the capital regime. 
The Basel II capital accord already contains mechanisms in Pillar II which enable regulators to 
impose additional capital charges for incentive structures that encourage risky behaviour. These 
provisions were consequently endorsed by the European Commission in the Larosière Report.
66 But 
reform options differ. Some policy makers prefer remuneration caps, while others choose to allow 
pay structures which reflect the economic position of individual firms. In the UK, for example, the 
FSA’s approach is based on assessing remuneration by reference to the overall risk posed by a 
financial institution, and on assessing the link between remuneration and excessive risk-taking; it is 
                                                            
63 See various articles providing analysis in this regard in: Viral and Richardson, supra note 24. 
64 Banking firms were the first to introduce bespoke pay contracts. For example UBS (See UBS adopts new executive 
pay model, Reuters, November 2008) Citibank (See Citi set to reward cooperation with overhaul of bonus system, 
Financial Times, 30 June 2008), Merrill Lynch (See Merrill vows to reform bonus system, Financial Times, 19 January 
2008), Deutsche Bank (See Deutsche Bank eyes ‘multi-year’ bonus system, Financial Times, 29 May, 2008). 
65 Financial Stability Forum, Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience, 
Basel, 2008. 
66 See De Larosière Report, supra note 22.  24 
 
not based on dictating pay levels.
67 The FSF recommendations on compensation, based on a ‘one 
size does not fit all’ principle, are intended to reduce incentives towards excessive risk taking that 
may arise from the structure of remuneration schemes, whilst seeking to avoid prescribing particular 
designs or levels of individual compensation.
68 The Commission’s Recommendations are similarly 
designed  to  avoid  excessive  risk-taking  but  while  they  only  have  the  status  of  voluntary 
Recommendations, they appear to be considerably prescriptive with respect to remuneration design. 
  The reform debate has therefore changed and so have the instruments for intervention, with 
intervention ‘hardening’, particularly in the EU The main objectives pursued by the Commission’s 
Company Law Action Plan in 2003, which set the foundations for the first wave of remuneration 
reforms,  were  to  strengthen  shareholders’  rights  and  to  foster  the  global  efficiency  and 
competitiveness of EU businesses as part of the wider effort to integrate the EU’s capital market. 
These objectives have been achieved, at least in part. But the financial crisis has exposed the need 
for  a  new  set  of  objectives  and  the  link  between  effective  corporate  governance,  executive 
remuneration, and risk management. In order to achieve the objectives of the 2003 Action Plan, the 
Commission  initially  preferred  not  to  impose  mandatory  rules  on  Member  States,  but  instead 
proceeded  by  way  of  encouraging  the  convergence  of  practices  and  regulations  across  the  EU 
through non-binding recommendations. As a result, Member State implementation of the related 
reforms  varied;  studies  also  show  that  soft  law  was  preferred  to  legislation,  as  a  means  of 
implementation,  for  most  of  the  provisions.
69  This  approach  may  not  necessarily point to  poor 
compliance.  Firms  that  voluntarily  adopt  a  more  rigorous  corporate  governance  structure  are 
rewarded with a positive effect on their firm value.
70 But poor levels of compliance in practice by 
market participants has made the current approach of European policy makers more stringent. The 
                                                            
67 H. Sants, Recent market events and the FSA’s response, Speech, FSA, 20 May 2008. 
68 FSF principles, supra note 25. 
69  See  Member  State  Questionnaires  on  Directors’  Remuneration  in  Listed  Companies,  available  at  ECGI: 
http://www.ecgi.org/remuneration/questionnaire/index_2008.htm. Answers to questionnaires were provided during the 
period 2007-2009, before the latest European reforms in corporate governance and legislation were adopted in response 
to the financial crisis. 
70 Study by Chhaochharia and Laeven (supra note 26) shows that  market rewards companies that are prepared to adopt 
governance  attributes  beyond  those  required  by  laws  and  common  corporate  practices  in  the  home  country  by 
distinguishing between firm-level and country-level corporate governance.  25 
 
latest wave of reforms, certainly at Member State level, envisage more binding rules rather than 
flexible  ‘comply  or  explain’  guidelines.  The  Commission  has  also  warned  that  the  two  2009 
Recommendations  represent  the  ‘first  stage’  in  a  series  of  proposals  to  realign  remuneration 
incentives with ‘sustainable long term performance’ and has suggested that it will be presenting 
proposals which will empower national supervisors to compel financial institutions to implement 
policies  consistent  with  effective  risk  management.
71  Although  the  current  wave  of  reforms  is 
focusing  on  the  financial  sector,  momentum  dynamics  and  public  hostility  are  such  that  wider 
application, through binding legislation, cannot be ruled out. 
 
3. THE EUROPEAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 Overview 
3.1.1 The EU Remuneration Regime and Recent Reforms 
The first wave of reforms on executive remuneration, which are considered in this section, 
relate to the 2003 Company Law Action Plan. The Enron-era sequence of scandals and efforts to 
make  European  industry  more  competitive,  to  strengthen  shareholder  rights  and  to  reinforce 
protection for companies’ stakeholders led the Commission to issue its Company Law Action Plan 
in May 2003. This has set the European agenda in the corporate governance field. As part of the 
Action Plan’s corporate governance agenda the EU adopted two important Recommendations: the 
2004 Recommendation fostering an appropriate regime for the remuneration of directors of listed 
companies
72 and the 2005 Recommendation on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors of 
listed  companies  and  on  the  committees  of  the  (supervisory)  board.
73  A  number  of  Directives 
adopted  under  the  EU’s  Financial  Services  Action  Plan  (FSAP)  also  form  part  of  the  EU’s 
remuneration  matrix  by  improving  corporate  transparency  generally  and  with  respect  to 
                                                            
71 COM(2009) 211 p. 5. 
72 2004/913/EC. 
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remuneration and by addressing insider dealing risks.
74 In March 2009 the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS) also published its principles on remuneration policy, which address 
the key aspects of a well functioning remuneration policy and is designed to support the sound 
operation of credit institution institutions.
75 
But the 2004 and 2005 Recommendations are the heart of the EU’s remuneration regime. 
The Recommendation fostering an appropriate regime for the remuneration of directors provides for 
high standards of disclosure on directors' pay and recommends greater involvement of shareholders 
in decisions relating to remuneration. The Recommendation adopts four mechanisms in support of 
efficient remuneration: i) disclosure of information on companies’ remuneration policy, its structure 
and performance criteria;
76 ii) a shareholders’ vote on the remuneration policy, which can be either 
binding  or  advisory;
77  iii)  disclosure  of  individual  directors’  remuneration  package;
78  iv)  prior 
approval of share option schemes.
79 
The 2004 Recommendation on directors’ remuneration must be considered in conjunction 
with the 2005 Recommendation on the role of non-executive directors and board committees, given 
the role that non-executive directors and remuneration committees play in remuneration matters. 
                                                            
74  The  Transparency  Directive  enhances  the  transparency  in  reporting  including  the  remuneration  policies,  total 
remuneration  paid,  any  contingent  or  deferred  compensation  and  benefits  in  kind  granted  to  each  member  of 
administrative, management or supervisory body. The Accounts Modernisation Directive encourages consistency across 
Member States in the level of narrative reporting presented in the annual report. The Market Abuse Directive makes 
provisions for senior executives to notify any share transactions and refrain from any insider dealings. The Prospectus 
Directive makes provisions related to employee share plans and grants of options.  
75 Draft high-level principles of Remuneration Policies (2009), available at www.c-ebs.org.  
76 The remuneration statement should include the following information: i) explanation of the relative importance of the 
variable and non-variable components of directors’ remuneration; ii) sufficient information on the performance criteria 
on which shares or variable compensation is based; iii) sufficient information on the linkage between remuneration and 
performance; iv) the main parameters and rationale for any annual bonus scheme and non-cash benefits; v) description 
of  the  main  characteristics of  supplementary  pension or  early  retirement  schemes;  vi)  summary  on  the  terms  and 
duration  of  contracts,  provisions  for  termination  payments;  decision-making  process  used  for  determining  the 
remuneration policy. 
77 The agenda of the annual meeting should contain information related to the role of the relevant bodies responsible for 
setting directors’ remuneration, the remuneration policy and any significant change to the remuneration policy. 
78 Individual disclosure of: i) total amount of salary paid, including attendance fees fixed by the AGM; ii) remuneration 
paid in the form of profit-sharing and/or bonus payments and the reason for granting; iii) compensation in connection 
with the termination of contract; iv) total estimated value of non-cash benefits considered as remuneration; v) number of 
share options offered or granted; vi) number of shares exercised, exercise price or value of interest; vii) number of 
shares unexercised, exercise price, exercise date, main conditions for exercise of rights; viii) loans, advance payments 
and guarantees, including the amount outstanding and interest rate. 
79  Approval  of:  i)  grant  of  share-based  schemes,  including  share  options  to  directors;  ii)  determination  of  their 
maximum number and the main conditions for granting; iii) term within which options can be exercised; iv) conditions 
for any subsequent change in the exercise price of the options. 27 
 
This  Recommendation  aims  to  improve  shareholders'  control  over  executive  management  by 
reinforcing  the  presence  of  independent  directors  on  boards  and  board  committees.  The 
Recommendation includes two principles which are closely related to remuneration governance: it 
recommends  that  board  committees  be  created  for  issues  particularly  vulnerable  to  conflict  of 
interest (i.e. nomination, remuneration and audit committees) where these tasks are not the direct 
responsibility of shareholders; it also recommends that there be a strong presence of independent 
directors in board committees and suggests that there be a clear delineation of the role of such 
bodies.  In  particular  it  recommends  that  the  remuneration  committee  should  be  comprised 
exclusively of non-executive or supervisory directors, a majority of whom should be independent. 
  Since differing approaches to corporate governance are deeply rooted in national traditions, 
the Recommendations  provide for a certain degree of flexibility in the ways in which Member 
States can apply the relevant principles. A self-regulatory, market-based approach, based on non-
binding recommendations, and thereby avoiding a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution, has been adopted This 
approach  reflects  Member  States’  different  views  concerning  the  role  of  firms,  the  bodies 
responsible for determining the remuneration policy for directors and the structure and level of 
remuneration of each director.  
Member States are free to adopt the Recommendations, if at all, either through legislation or 
through  soft  law,  based  on  the  ‘comply  or  explain’  principle.
80  Our  research  reveals  that  the 
Recommendations have been mainly transposed by means of soft law and on a ‘comply or explain’ 
basis.
81 Given the flexibility of this principle, investors have a paramount role to play in carefully 
evaluating a firm’s corporate governance; they should examine the reasons provided by the firm 
whenever  it  departs  from  the  Recommendations  or  fails  to  comply  with  the  same,  making  a 
                                                            
80 On 6 March 2006, the European Corporate Governance Forum issued a statement clarifying the ‘comply or explain’ 
principle: see Statement from the European Corporate Governance Forum on the principle of "comply-or-explain", 
available  at  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/ecgforum/index_en.htm.  To  ensure  that  the  principle  is 
effective, there must be a real obligation to comply or explain. 
81 Except for Greece, where the ‘comply or explain’ principles is not available. See Answers to Questionnaire on 
Directors’  Remuneration  in  Listed  Companies:  Greece,  by  E.E.  Perakis,  available  at  ECGI: 
http://www.ecgi.org/remuneration/questionnaire/index_2008.htm. 28 
 
reasoned  judgment  in  each  case.  The  effectiveness  of  ‘comply  or  explain’  and  of  investor 
monitoring  is,  however,  doubtful,  given  low  levels  of  conformity  with  the  relevant 
Recommendations, considered in Section 4 of this paper. 
82  
The two Recommendations have as their main objective the achievement of appropriate 
governance controls through enhanced transparency and a strengthening of shareholder rights. As 
discussed in section 2 above, the global financial crisis has, however, extended  these objectives 
further.  As part of the EU’s response to  the financial crisis, and given that the implementation of 
the  existing  Recommendations  was  not  satisfactory,  the  EU  supplemented  the  existing 
Recommendations  with  two  new  Recommendations  in  2009.
83  The  scale  of  the  Commission’s 
ambition is considerable. By contrast with the earlier 2004-2005 reforms which sought to align 
shareholder and management interests, with these reforms the EU is seeking, more ambitiously, to 
redress imbalances in directors’ pay in all listed companies, to deliver specific reforms to the design 
of pay packages and to reform remuneration policies in the financial sector. 
The general 2009 remuneration Recommendation focuses to a much greater extent than the 
2004/2005 Recommendations on the design of remuneration. It makes specific recommendations 
concerning the design of employees.
84 It also recommends more extensive disclosure
85 and seeks to 
strengthen the remuneration committee.
86 The parallel financial services Recommendation focuses 
in  particular  on  risk-taking  in  ‘financial  undertakings’  (including  credit  institutions,  investment 
firms  and  insurance  companies)  and  by  those  personnel  whose  professional  activities  have  a 
material impact on the risk profile of the financial undertaking. It recommends that remuneration 
policies  in  these  institutions  should  be  consistent  with  sound  risk  management  and  the 
                                                            
82 In July 2007 the EC published two reports on Member State application of the two EU recommendations: COM 
SEC(2007)  1022,  Report  on  the  application  by  EU  Member  States  of  the  EC  Recommendation  on  directors’ 
remuneration, July 2007; COM SEC(2007) 1021, Report on the application by the Member States of the EU of the 
Commission Recommendation on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors of listed companies and on the 
committees of the (supervisory) board, July 2007. Both reports conclude that the application of corporate governance 
standards regarding remuneration has improved, but some weaknesses remain.  
83 Both Recommendations require Member State transposition by 31 December 2009. 
84 C(2009) 3177, Rec. 9. 
85 Particularly with respect to performance criteria (C(2009) 3177, Rec. 5). 
86  For  example,  by  recommending  that  at  least  one  member  have  knowledge  of  and  experience  in  the  field  of 
remuneration policy (C(2009) 3177, Rec.7). 29 
 
undertaking’s long-term interests,
87 makes specific recommendations with respect to the design of 
pay,
88 seeks to strengthen governance
89 and disclosure (to stakeholders generally),
90 and calls for 
supervision of remuneration by the relevant supervisory authorities.
91 When advocating increased 
disclosure under the new regime, the Commission has implied that the level of the information to be 
disclosed  should  take  into  account  the  nature,  size  and  scope  of  the  financial  institution.
92 
Accordingly some degree of competition between financial undertakings’ might be expected with 
respect to disclosure; industry peer groups may therefore play a greater role in the remuneration 
process. As noted above, it also appears that the Commission intends to issue further legislative 
proposals for financial institutions. The main objective of the new legislation would be to subject 
remuneration policy to prudential oversight.
93 In other words, financial institutions will be asked to 
put more money aside if they want to reward their directors in a way that could encourage excessive 
risk  taking.  Specifically,  the  Capital  Requirements  Directive  will  include  certain  provisions 
regarding remuneration in the financial sector. 
94 
The Commission is, accordingly, aiming, albeit through soft law, to embed a managerial 
culture which seeks the long-term sustainability of companies, rather than quick but risky short-
term results, as often pursued in previous years. To reach this goal, it has also made some ambitious 
design recommendations. The general 2009 Recommendation recommends vesting periods of at 
least three years for director share awards and share options and also requires directors to hold a 
substantial number of shares in their firms until the end of their employment. This recommendation 
is  designed  to  increase  directors’  long-term  commitment  to  the  firm.  Several  other  related 
                                                            
87 C(2009) 3159, Rec. 3. 
88 Including that a maximum limit is placed on variable remuneration, that a major part of significant bonuses be 
deferred, that bonuses be repaid where they have awarded on the basis of data which subsequently proves to be mis-
stated, that performance assessment be placed in a multi-year framework and reflect non-financial criteria, including 
compliance  (C(2009) 3159, Recs. 3-5).  
89 C(2009) 3159, Rec. 6. 
90 C(2009) 3159, Rec. 7-9. 
91 C(2009) 3159, Recs. 10-12. 
92 COM 2009/3159, art 9 (III). 
93 See EC Communication, IP/09/674, 29 April 2009. 
94 At the time of writing, the European Parliament adopted the new rules on capital requirements (6 May 2009), to be 
implemented by banks by 2010. 30 
 
provisions are common to both Recommendations and are therefore applicable to issuers across all 
sectors.
95  
While ambitious, most of the new recommendations build on provisions already adopted in 
some Member State regulations, principally in corporate governance guidelines. Accordingly, and 
in  addition to the substantive objectives mentioned above, the Commission also aims to achieve 
greater harmonisation in this area. Whether this will be achieved is uncertain. Given the cross-
border  nature  of  financial  institutions  which  typically  adopt  group  structures,  some  degree  of 
convergence with respect to the recommendations for financial institutions might be expected.
96 But 
on  the  other  hand,  only  limited  harmonisation  has  been  achieved  with  respect  to  the  earlier 
Recommendations  and  it  will  be  interesting  to  assess  whether  the  financial  sector  will  behave 
differently from other sectors. Convergence pressure is likely to be increased, however, given that 
the Recommendations reflect and are based on an international reform movement and given the 
international market within which financial institutions operate.
97 
 
3.1.2 Reviewing the Remuneration Regime   
The  remainder  of  section  3  reviews  remuneration  law  and  best  practice,  following  the 
adoption of the  first wave of Recommendations in 2004-2005, in specific areas (the remuneration 
committee, ‘say on pay, disclosure, non-executive director pay, pay design, and recent financial 
crisis reforms). A large part of our analysis is based on the answers to a questionnaire sent to 
specialists from 17 European Member States.
98 Our findings emphasise the persistent differences in 
regulation across the EU with respect to remuneration disclosure, policy and certain elements of 
remuneration  design.  While  most  Member  States  have  amended  their  laws  and  best  practice 
                                                            
95 The main common provisions are: i) an appropriate balance between fixed and variable pay; ii) clawback provisions; 
iii) deferral of bonus with a minimum deferment period; iv) termination payments linked to performance. 
96  “Principles  on  sound  remuneration  policy  should  apply  at  group  level  to  the  parent  undertaking  and  to  its 
subsidiaries”, COM 2009/3159, art. 1.4 (I). 
97 See FSF principles, supra note 25. 
98  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  The 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK. Questionnaires were sent in 2007-2008. They are available at 
ECGI’s website: http://www.ecgi.org/remuneration/ecgi_research.htm. 31 
 
guidelines, adherence to the 2004 and 2005 Recommendations has, however, been partial. Our 
findings  show  that  the framework  for  directors’  remuneration  has  been  implemented  by  policy 
makers  mainly  through  soft  law  and  only  to  a  lesser  extent  through  regulation.  This  situation 
changed in 2008, however, with governments intervening in an attempt to enhance public rules for 
remuneration. 
The main recent national reforms include the following. In 2006 a number of changes were 
made to the UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance, which already contained important 
guidelines on executive remuneration, complementing the earlier 2002 company law reforms (now 
in the 2006 Companies Act) which introduced the advisory ‘say on pay’ and required more detailed 
disclosure  through  a  remuneration  report  requirement.  The  Code  is  also  complemented  by  the 
industry ABI guidelines on policies and practices for executive remuneration and the ABI/NAPF 
Joint Statement on Executive Contracts and Severance, which recommend a closer link between 
incentives  and  the  achievement  of  targets.
99  They  focus  on  the  importance  of  rewarding 
performance and place responsibility on the remuneration committee in the remuneration-setting 
process.  
A law regulating the transparency of executive pay came into force in Germany in 2006, 
under which companies are obliged to publish the amount and structure of the remuneration of 
individual directors.
100 Further amendments were made to the German Corporate Governance Code 
in  2008  which  strengthen  the  responsibility  of  the  supervisory  board  for  management  board 
compensation.
101 In Italy the new Corporate Governance Code was published in March 2006. This 
Code contains many changes to its predecessor, e.g.: the definition of the remuneration structure 
and  terms  distinguishes  between  executive  and  non-executive  directors;  the  duties  of  the 
remuneration committee are also specified. In Spain, the new Unified Corporate Governance Code 
                                                            
99  Association  of  British  Insurers  (ABI),  Executive  Remuneration  –  ABI  Guidelines  on  Policies  and  Practices,  3 
December 2007; ABI/NAPF Joint Statement on Executive Contracts and Severance, 18 February, 2008. 
100 Disclosure of Board Compensation Act (“Vorstandsvergütungsoffenlegungsgesetz”) (2005). 
101  See  Answers  to  Questionnaire  on  Directors’  Remuneration  in  Listed  Companies:  Germany,  by  P.O.  Mülbert, 
available at ECGI: http://www.ecgi.org/remuneration/questionnaire/index_2008.htm. 32 
 
was published in May 2006.
102 It provides that the remuneration report should be submitted to the 
AGM for an advisory vote and that the remuneration of individual directors should be disclosed in 
the  remuneration  report.  France’s  MEDEF/AFEP  issued  two  recommendations  concerning  the 
compensation  of  executive  directors  in  2008,  aimed  at  enhancing  disclosure  and  introducing 
guidelines on a clear link between remuneration and performance in the area of incentive-based pay 
and severance payments.
103 The Dutch Corporate Governance Code, as amended in 2008, aims to 
align  remuneration  closely  with  the  company’s  strategy  and  related  risks  and  encourages  a 
remuneration policy that creates long-term value.
104 The new 2009 Belgian Corporate Governance 
Code pays most attention to the recommendations concerning executive remuneration, advocating 
complete transparency about remuneration and severance towards shareholders.
105  
Several  other  European  corporate  governance  codes  have  been  amended  in  the  period 
following  the  2004-2005  Recommendations;  the  revisions  generally  emphasise  increased 
transparency, new guidelines on remuneration and greater shareholder power over the remuneration 
process.
106 Other reform proposals, particularly by financial supervisory authorities, are mentioned 
later in this Section.  
International reforms have also taken place over this period, with the European governance 
reforms developing in parallel with related US initiatives. Notable US reforms include the 2006 
SEC  rules  concerning  the  transparency  of  executive  remuneration,  related  party  transactions, 
                                                            
102 See Answers to Questionnaire on Directors’ Remuneration in Listed Companies: Spain, by I. Farrando, available at 
ECGI: http://www.ecgi.org/remuneration/questionnaire/index_2008.htm. 
103 AFEP/MEDEF Remuneration of Executive Corporate Officers of French Sociétés Anonymes: Legal and Tax Rules, 
June, 2008; Recommendations Concerning the Compensation of Executive Directors of Companies whose Shares are 
Admitted on a Regulated Market, October, 2008. 
104 See Answers to Questionnaire on Directors’ Remuneration in Listed Companies: The Netherlands, by C. Van der 
Elst and A. Gülsum, available at ECGI: http://www.ecgi.org/remuneration/questionnaire/index_2008.htm. 
105 See Answers to Questionnaire on Directors’ Remuneration in Listed Companies: Belgium, by L. Van den Steen and 
C. Van der Elst, available at ECGI: http://www.ecgi.org/remuneration/questionnaire/index_2008.htm. 
106 Including, among others: Austria: Code of Corporate Governance, revised (2007); Luxembourg: The Ten Principles 
of Corporate Governance of the Luxembourg Stock Exchange (2006); Denmark: Committee on Corporate Governance, 
Recommendations  for  Corporate  Governance  of  August  15,  2005,  revised  (2008);  Finland:  Finnish  Corporate 
Governance Code (2008); Hungary: Corporate Governance Recommendations (2008); Poland: Code of Best Practice 
for  WSE  Listed  Companies  (2007).  All  codes,  previous  and  amended  versions,  are  available  at 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php;  Portugal:  CMVM  Regulation  n.1/2007,  CMVM  Code  on  Corporate 
Governance (Recommendations on Corporate Governance) (2007), Sweden; Code of Corporate Governance, revised 
(2008). 33 
 
director independence and directors’ ownership of shares. The reforms aim to make proxy and 
information statements, annual reports and registration statements more user-friendly and to ensure 
that  shareholders  are  better  informed  about  the  remuneration  of  directors.  Most  international 
organisations that are active in corporate governance have also amended their guidelines, including 
provisions related to remuneration.
107 
 
3.2 Remuneration Committee 
In  the  ongoing  debate  on  executive  remuneration,  certainly  prior  to  the  financial  crisis, 
questions as to the resilience of the link between remuneration and corporate performance have 
often been raised. The transformation, in some case, of ‘pay-for-performance’ into a ‘rewards-for-
failure’ mechanism has been linked to poor governance during the remuneration process and, in 
particular, on ineffective remuneration committees which can exert significant influence on the 
setting of remuneration.  
The 2005 Recommendation on the role of non-executive directors as well as international 
corporate  governance  guidelines  require  that  a  dedicated  board  remuneration  committee  be 
established. This committee is designed, in part, to increase the efficiency of the (supervisory) 
board  in  that  it  should  reduce  conflicts  of  interest  with  respect  to  directors’  remuneration.  To 
achieve this purpose, the committee should, according to the Recommendation, be composed of 
exclusively non-executive directors, who are in the majority independent. The Recommendation 
allows for some flexibility in how the committee is constituted by allowing the responsibilities of 
the nomination, audit and remuneration committees to be combined. Firms must, however, explain 
both the reasons why they have chosen an alternative approach and how the combined committee 
meets the objectives which are identified for the three separate committees. The Commission’s 
                                                            
107  See  International  Corporate  Governance  Network  (ICGN),  Remuneration  Guidelines,  2006,  available  at 
www.icgn.org; United Nations (UN), Guidance on Good Practices in Corporate Governance Disclosure, 2006, available 
at  www.unctad.org;  Organization  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  (OECD),  Principles  of  Corporate 
Governance,  2004  and  OECD  Corporate  Governance  Lessons  from  the  Financial  Crisis,  2009,  both  available  at 
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2009 Recommendation on directors’ remuneration sets out additional principles on the role and 
operation of the remuneration committee in order to increase its responsibility in the remuneration 
process and to avoid conflicts of interest in the exercise of its functions.
108 
Most Member State corporate governance codes require that a remuneration committee be 
established and apply this requirement on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. We found, however, that the 
wording of different corporate governance codes reveals differences in the importance attached to, 
and  composition  of,  the  remuneration  committees.  Generally  the  Codes  accommodate  ‘joined 
committees’  (which  usually  combine  the  nomination  and  remuneration  committee  functions), 
although  the  ability  of  committee  members  to  focus  effectively  on  the  different  tasks  of  these 
functions  is  questionable.  On  the  other  hand,  the  nomination  and  remuneration  processes  are 
interlinked and efficiencies may follow. 
The composition of the remuneration committee across the Member States is influenced by 
the  different  definitions  that  the  different  Codes  adopt  with  respect  to  the  independence  of  
directors.  Each  country’s  best  practice  guidelines  adopts    its    own  definition  of  independence. 
Boards are also typically charged with determining what constitutes independence according to 
their own judgment.
109 We also found variations in the best practice (corporate governance code) 
requirements for the composition of the remuneration committee; the independence requirements 
ranged from, i.e., “exclusively” independent members to a “majority”, to a “sufficient” number of 
independent members. This variation is significant as it may have an impact on the activity of the 
committees established by firms in various countries and, implicitly, on their remuneration process. 
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109 Perhaps one of the most complete approaches is offered by the UK Combined Code that encourages a firm’s own 
judgment as to the most appropriate behaviour towards directors’ independence: the Code refers to “independent in 
character and judgment” and involves a consideration as to “whether there are relationships or circumstances which are 
likely to affect, or could appear to affect, the director’s judgment” (A.3.1). 35 
 
The UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance – applicable to the UK and Ireland
110 – 
and the Dutch Tabaksblat Code recommend the creation of a separate remuneration committee, 
composed  entirely  of  non-executive,  independent  directors.  Additionally,  in  the  Netherlands  no 
more than one member of the remuneration committee may be a member of the management board 
of  another  Dutch  listed  company.  The  Austrian  Code  of  Corporate  Governance
111  and 
Luxembourgish  principles  of  corporate  governance  recommend  a  “sufficient”  number  of 
independent members.
 112 Polish best practice guidelines provide for a remuneration committee to 
be established within the supervisory board; however, they do not address the composition of the 
committee, nor lay down its tasks or procedures.
113 In most other countries, corporate governance 
best practices/codes recommend the creation of a remuneration committee composed of all non-
executive, but in the majority independent directors.  
The chairmanship of this committee also exposes differences between the Member States. 
Best practice guidelines in the UK, Ireland and the Netherlands stipulate that the chairperson of the 
board may not chair the remuneration committee (although the UK Combined Code permits the 
chairman to sit on the committee as long the chairman met the Code’s independence requirements 
on initial appointment). Other best practice guidelines allow for the common chairmanship of the 
board and the remuneration committee, but often recommend that only a non-executive director 
(including the board chairperson) should chair the committee. According to the Austrian guidelines, 
the chairperson of the remuneration committee should always be the chairperson of the supervisory 
                                                            
110 Ireland follows the same regulations as UK, including the Companies’ Act and the Combined Code of Corporate 
Governance, with the exception of the Listing Rules. Until October 2007, the Irish Stock Exchange applied the listing 
Rules set by the FSA in the UK, with a supplement adapting the Listing Rules to Irish conditions and the Irish legal 
context. However, it now produces its own set of Listing Rules, which tend to track FSA’s Rules closely. For an 
analysis  of  the  Irish  corporate  governance  system  of  remuneration,  see  Answers  to  Questionnaire  on  Directors’ 
Remuneration  in  Listed  Companies:  Ireland,  by  B.  Clarke,  available  at  ECGI: 
http://www.ecgi.org/remuneration/questionnaire/index_2008.htm. 
111 See Answers to Questionnaire on Directors’ Remuneration in Listed Companies: Austria, by S. Kalss, available at 
ECGI: http://www.ecgi.org/remuneration/questionnaire/index_2008.htm. 
112 See Answers to Questionnaire on Directors’ Remuneration in Listed Companies: Luxembourg, by P.H. Conac, 
available at ECGI: http://www.ecgi.org/remuneration/questionnaire/index_2008.htm. 
113 See Answers to Questionnaire on Directors’ Remuneration in Listed Companies: Poland, by M. Majcher, available at 
ECGI: http://www.ecgi.org/remuneration/questionnaire/index_2008.htm. 36 
 
board.
114 German recommendations and practices in this area vary significantly from the position in 
other Member States. The Cromme Code indicates that it is good practice for many companies to 
have special committees for specific tasks, but does not give a clear indication concerning the 
remuneration process and does not include strict rules concerning independence. It does, however, 
provide that such committees should be comprised of at least three members, including at least one 
worker representative. But the German supervisory board’s scope for discretion was substantially 
curtailed in 2005 following the ruling by the German Federal Court of Justice (criminal division) in 
what has become known as the ‘Mannesmann-Case’. The core question at issue was the legality of 
appreciation awards granted in the context of the takeover of Mannesmann by Vodafone in 2000.
115 
The remuneration committee is not always central to remuneration-setting. In some Member 
States,  shareholders  have  wide  decision-making  powers  on  remuneration  issues.
116  The  general 
meeting has, by law, the sole competence to decide on the remuneration of directors in a number of 
countries. This may involve decisions on the remuneration packages of individual members or the 
approval of the total amount of remuneration. In countries where companies have dual boards, 
shareholders  are  generally  responsible  for  determining  the  remuneration  of  supervisory  board 
members, according to the articles of incorporation of the company.
117 Remuneration fixed by the 
                                                            
114 Austrian Code of Corporate Governance (2007), point 43. 
115 The German court stated that, as a general rule, payments of that particular kind (golden parachutes) may only be 
made  if  the  employment  contract  between  the  company  and  the  executive  director  ex  ante  provides  for  such  an 
obligation stipulated ex ante. In the absence of the said clause the company may make such gratuitous payment only if 
the company will benefit from it. Relevant benefits to be taken into account are only those that are ‘simultaneous’ and 
‘adequate’. A payment that does not fulfill these requirements qualifies as a waste of the company’s assets, and the 
members  of  the  supervisory  board  can  be  held  liable  for  the  criminal  offence  of  a  fraudulent  breach  of  trust. 
Consequently,  some  uncertainty  has  arisen  regarding  severance  awards.  See  brief  on  the  ‘Mannesmann  Case’  in 
Answers to Questionnaire by P. O. Mülbert, supra note 101. Additional literature on the Case: C.J. Milhaupt and K. 
Pistor (2008), The Mannesmann Executive Compensation Trial in Germany, in “Law and Capitalism, What Corporate 
Crises Reveal About Legal Systems and Economic Development around the World”, The University of Chicago Press; 
P. Kolla (2004), The Mannesmann Trial and the Role of the Courts, 5 German Law Journal No 7 – Private Law; M.P. 
Rolshoven (2004), The Last Word? – The July 22, 2004 Acquittals in the Mannesmann Trial,  5 German Law Review 
No 8. 
116 COM SEC(2007) 1022.  
117 There are deviations from the norm, due to governance systems. For example, a Swedish company’s board is usually 
made up exclusively of non-executive directors, except for the CEO. Board’s remuneration is decided by the general 
meeting with single majority, usually after a proposal from the largest shareholder or a nomination committee. The 
Board decides upon the remuneration to the CEO, and the CEO decides upon remuneration to other management. The 
AGM shall decide upon remuneration principles for the CEO and the top management of the company. The principles 
are binding upon the board when they set remuneration for the CEO and on the CEO when he or she decides upon 
remuneration to management (Swedish Corporate Governance Code (2008), Swedish Companies Act.  37 
 
articles can be modified by the general meeting through a simple majority.
118 The remuneration of 
the members of the executive or management board is fixed by the supervisory board, following 
proposals  made  by  the  remuneration  committee,  where  it  exists.  In  some  Member  States,  the 
remuneration policy is submitted for approval to the general meeting of shareholders.  
Corporate governance codes across the Member States generally adopt guidelines regarding 
the  role  and  particular  functions  of  the  remuneration  committee.  However,  as  with  all  the 
remuneration  guidelines,  differences  are  common.  For  example,  the  2009  Belgium  Code  of 
Corporate Governance also makes provision for the responsibility of the remuneration committee to 
make  proposals  to  the  board  on  the  remuneration  policy  for  non-executive  directors.
119  But 
typically, the role of the remuneration committee in most Member States includes the following: it 
makes proposals on general remuneration policy for executive or managing directors; it makes 
proposals on individual remuneration packages; it monitors compliance by the company with its 
remuneration disclosure obligations; it debates the company’s general policy on the granting of 
share-based  incentive  schemes  and  makes  related  proposals  to  the  board;  it  reviews  the 
remuneration information provided in the annual report; it consults with the chairman / CEO on 
remuneration issues; it appoints, and consults with, external advisors on remuneration. As already 
emphasised, the independence of the remuneration committee and of any external consultants in 
relation to the management / executive board is an essential element of best practice. In this regard, 
and in order to minimise potential conflicts of interest between board remuneration and that of the 
rest of the company, it is generally desirable that advisers are appointed by the committee and do 
not advise the company or the executive directors in the same time.
120  
 
                                                            
118 In Greece, any other remuneration, the amount of which is not provided by the articles, has to be approved by special 
resolution of the general meeting (but, if excessive, is subject to reduction by a court decision at the request of a 
minority of 1/10 of the capital). 
119 For corporate governance developments in Belgium see Answers to Questionnaire on Belgium by L. Van den Steen 
and  C.  Van  der  Elst,  supra  note  105,  Van  der  Elst,  C.  (2008),  The  Belgian  Struggle  for  Corporate  Governance 
Improvements,  ECGI  Law  Working  Paper,  N°.114/2008,  available  at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1261448. 
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3.3 Say on Pay 
The role of the general meeting of shareholders in remuneration-setting varies across the 
EU.  In  order  to  increase  board  accountability,  the  2004  Recommendation  on  directors’ 
remuneration recommends that remuneration policy be an explicit item on the agenda of the annual 
general meeting. Member States may, however, provide that a vote will be held only if requested by 
shareholders representing at least 25% of the total number of votes held by shareholders present or 
represented  at  the  general  meeting.  Shareholder  approval  is  also  recommended  by  the 
Recommendation for all share schemes, share options or any other right to acquire shares, by way 
of resolution at the general meeting prior to their adoption; the approval relates to the scheme itself, 
and not to the grant of particular share benefits under the schemes.
121 The 2009 Recommendations 
reinforce the importance of shareholder engagement in the remuneration process, recommending 
that  shareholders  and,  in  particular,  institutional  shareholders,  should  be  encouraged  to  attend 
general  meetings  where  appropriate  and  make  ‘considered  use’  of  their  votes.  But  the 
Recommendation is merely exhortatory and does not substantively strengthen the ‘say on pay’.  
Although  shareholders  usually  have  a  say  in  determining  the  remuneration  of  the 
(supervisory) board, only a few Member States have encouraged companies to involve shareholders 
to a greater extent in the determination of remuneration policy for the management board/executive 
management,  even  if  only  on  an  advisory  basis.
122  In  most  jurisdictions  the  vote  on  the 
remuneration report or remuneration policy is not a separate item on the general meeting agenda; 
approval  of  the  annual  accounts,  for  example,  only  implicitly  constitutes  approval  of  the 
remuneration  policy.
123  This  approach  may  reflect  the  role  of  controlling  shareholders  in  the 
respective jurisdiction or in the individual firm, as discussed in Section 2 above, and the more 
limited role of the general meeting. In a notable exception, but reflecting a different shareholder 
voice  model,  the  2006  Companies  Act  (reflecting  earlier  reforms  in  2002)  requires  quoted 
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companies to prepare a directors’ remuneration report and to put the report to a shareholder vote.
124 
The vote is advisory and requires a 50% majority of those voting. Recently, however, other Member 
States  have  introduced  a  vote  on  the  company’s  remuneration  policy.  In  the  Netherlands  and 
Sweden, the remuneration policy must, by law, be submitted for approval at the general meeting ex-
ante.  
According  to  the  Spanish  corporate  governance  guidelines,  boards  should  submit  a 
consultative  report  on the  directors’  remuneration  policy  to  the  vote of  the  general  meeting  of 
shareholders as a separate item on the agenda. Conversely, other Member State regulations do not 
specifically require  shareholder  approval  of  the  remuneration  policy,  despite  providing  that  the 
general meeting has a function in this respect. For example the Danish and Portuguese guidelines 
simply state that a declaration on the policy for remunerating members of a company’s corporate 
bodies should be submitted to the attention of shareholders at the AGM, but does not provide 
further  explanation  or  suggest  that  approval  be  obtained.
125  In  Italy,  approval  of  remuneration 
policy is required only for banks.
126 In Germany, the general meeting plays only a very limited role 
in  determining  the  remuneration  of  the  members  of  the  management  board.  The  law  neither 
mandates shareholder approval of directors’ remuneration nor approval of the remuneration policy 
or a remuneration report. The general meeting is even barred from adopting a pertinent resolution 
on  a  voluntary  basis,  since  the  general  meeting  may  only  decide  on  matters  concerning  the 
management of the company if requested by the management board.
127  
Most  Member  States,  however,  have  recommended  or  imposed  shareholder  approval  of 
share-based incentive schemes as a matter of company law, although divergences also exist here. 
                                                            
124 Companies Act 2006, ss. 420-421 and s. 439. 
125 Danish Committee on Corporate Governance’s Recommendations for corporate governance, of August 15, 2005, 
section  VI  revised  by  February  6,  2008.  See  Answers  to  Questionnaire  on  Directors’  Remuneration  in  Listed 
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Some States limit approval requirements to certain types of share-based remuneration. Whilst they 
have little say in the setting of remuneration, German shareholders do, however, have a vote with 
respect to some forms of performance-based remuneration. This holds true for stock options funded 
by contingent capital, as well as for stock options funded by own shares, if the company first has to 
acquire the shares. In Austria, in case of a contingent capital increase to be distributed among 
members of the management board (as well as members of the supervisory board, employees or 
senior management), the par value of the share capital cannot be more than 20%. On the other hand, 
if the options are assigned to the management board, employees or senior management, the general 
meeting will then be allowed to fix a total amount. If own shares are used for the stock option 
program, the general assembly will not be competent to decide upon the stock-option program. In 
Luxembourg and Sweden, only share-based remuneration involving new share issues, share options 
and any other new share acquisition rights are to be approved by the general meeting.
128 Most other 
regulations are generic, requiring approval of share schemes by shareholders. But in all cases, for 
share schemes to be approved, the policy for these schemes should be clearly explained in the report 
and to the general meeting when shareholders are asked to authorise the award of share options or 
shares.  
It remains to be seen whether the vote on remuneration policy will be adopted in practice in 
all European jurisdictions, although the initial experience does not augur well. 
 
3.4 Disclosure 
The EC’s 2007 evaluation of the implementation of the 2004 Recommendation shows that 
the recommendation on remuneration policy disclosure is followed by about 60% of the Member 
States, although half of these Member States only follow the Recommendation in part and in a 
number of the Member States the specific disclosure requirements are not specified.  
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Most  Member  States  do  not  specifically  require  companies  to  produce  a  separate 
remuneration report (although the UK requires that a separate Directors’ Remuneration Report is 
produced)
129.  Most  local  regulations  provide  that  the  information  related  to  remuneration  of 
directors, including remuneration policy and levels, can be included anywhere in the annual report, 
i.e.  in  the  corporate  governance report,
130  in  the  management  report  and/or  in the notes  to the 
financial  statements.  In  this  case,  the  remuneration  policy  gets  shareholder  approval  indirectly, 
through a vote on the annual report. In many cases, some or all information is duplicated in the 
notes. Exceptions exist on both extremes: legal requirements to produce a distinct remuneration 
report (e.g. UK)
131 or no specific requirements whatsoever (e.g. Greece)
132. The requirement for 
disclosure of the remuneration policy varies and not all Member States require that information 
which reflects the details outlined in the 2004-2005 EC Recommendation be presented.
133 Although 
there is some convergence with respect to disclosure and non-disclosure,
134 our research found that 
Member State regulations differ, particularly with respect to areas outlined below.  
 
Individual directors’ pay 
Under  the  2004  Recommendation,  remuneration  reports  should  contain  clear  and 
comprehensible  information  about  the  remuneration  of  individual  directors,  which  is  easy  to 
understand and enables the shareholder to monitor its compliance with the company’s remuneration 
                                                            
129 Companies Act 2006 ss. 421-421. 
130 According to Spanish and Portuguese regulations, listed companies are required to publish a report on corporate 
governance to be presented either as a chapter of the annual report or in the form of an appendix to the said report and 
one of the chapters of this report shall include details of the remuneration framework. Spanish report on corporate 
governance has a standardised Q&A format that, generally, only addresses the questions of compliance with corporate 
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131 Companies Act 2006 ss. 420-421. 
132 Greek Codified Law 2190/1920 does not specify requirements for a remuneration policy, instead only provides that 
the notes on the accounts must disclose information on the total amounts paid to directors.  
133 For example provisions in regulations of the UK, Ireland, France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Hungary, 
Italy (particularly banks’ remuneration policy). In accordance with the Commission Recommendation the statement of 
remuneration policy must include the reasons and criteria on which remuneration is based and give details of the 
relative importance of the fixed and variable components (including performance-linked bonuses and equity-based 
remuneration) and of the compensation paid in connection with the termination of service. It must also specify the 
conditions applied to the contracts of executive directors, among them the terms of contracts, notice periods and any 
termination payments; the process for setting the remuneration of directors must also be disclosed.  
134 For example the forward-looking approach and the disclosure of external consultants are two conditions stipulated in 
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policy and with the general guidelines adopted for incentive pay. In 2007, the Commission found 
that a large majority of Member States had introduced high disclosure standards with regard to the 
remuneration of individual executives.
135 In most Member States disclosure is required by law on a 
mandatory basis. Disclosure is also usually required on an individual basis, although a few countries 
still recommend only aggregate disclosure. 
The variations are revealing. In Austria, there are no specific requirements to indicate the 
individual details of the remuneration paid to the members of the board of directors; the disclosure 
requirement  applies  only  to  the  remuneration  of  the  management  board.  In  Germany,  which 
traditionally has a dual-tier governance system made up of a supervisory board and a management 
board, individual disclosure for both tiers is required, however these requirements are omitted if the 
general meeting so resolves. Such a resolution, which may be adopted for a maximum of five years, 
requires a majority of at least three quarters of the share capital represented when the resolution is 
adopted.  Whereas  German  law  requires  disclosure  to  be  made  in  the  notes  on  the  financial 
statements, the Cromme Code recommends, somewhat less precisely, that disclosure with respect to 
management  board  members  should  be  made  in  a  remuneration  report  which,  as  part  of  the 
corporate governance report, describes the remuneration system for management board members in 
a generally understandable way and that disclosure with respect to supervisory board members shall 
be made in the corporate governance report.
 136   
In Belgium, individual disclosure of remuneration is required for non-executive directors 
and  for  the  CEO,  whilst  remuneration  of  all  other  senior  executives  should  be  presented  in 
aggregate form. If an executive manager is also a member of the board, information on the amount 
of  remuneration  he  receives  in  this  capacity  must  be  disclosed  in  the  remuneration  report.
137 
However,  details  on  share-incentive  schemes  must  be  disclosed  on  an  individual  basis  for  all 
directors. Greek law provides only for aggregate disclosure of remuneration of executive and non-
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executive  directors.
138  The  Dutch  and  French  recommendations  emphasise  the  importance  of 
disclosure for helping investors obtain a clear view not only of individual remuneration, but also the 
total cost of directors and of the remuneration policy applied.  
Differences also emerge with respect to the specific elements of remuneration that must be 
disclosed on an individual basis. Most regulations making provisions for individual disclosure refer 
to fixed and variable remuneration, but are less focused on the details of share-based remuneration 
schemes.  Individual  disclosure  of  remuneration  received  by  directors  during  preceding  years  is 
recommended by only a few national guidelines.
139 Although this may change with the current 
reform movement, generally we find that the information required on performance targets for share 
incentive schemes is much more detailed than the disclosure required concerning bonuses. This can 
be explained by the fact that bonuses are “visible” components and can be judged accordingly, 
while share incentive schemes can often be opaque and hide the real value being transferred to 
directors.  
 
Share-based incentive schemes 
Disclosure requirements for share-based incentive schemes generally refer to the number of 
options granted and related shares, the terms of such schemes, in particular the exercise price and 
how the price is determined, the respective estimated values of the instruments at the time they are 
issued, the periods during which the options can be granted and exercised and the related lock-up 
period, and the number of exercised options during the period under review.  
Additional requirements are stipulated by a number of Member States. German regulation, 
for example, requires that stock option plans include the value of the stock options. Similarly, 
French  and  Dutch  rules  require  disclosure  of  the  valuations  of  the  shares/options  granted. 
Disclosure  concerning vesting periods, lock-up periods and the valuation methods applied (in order 
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to determine whether performance criteria have been fulfilled) is required in only some Member 
States.
140 
UK  disclosure  requirements  for  share  incentive  schemes  are  particularly  stringent.  In 
addition to disclosure on performance conditions, listed companies must also give an explanation of 
why  such  performance  conditions  were  chosen,  a  summary  of  the  methods  used  to  assess 
performance and an explanation as to why such methods were chosen. If a director’s entitlement to 
share  options  or  long-term  incentive  awards  is  not  subject  to  performance  conditions,  an 
explanation as to why this is the case must also be provided.
141 The remuneration report must also 
contain a performance graph illustrating the total shareholder return for each class of the company’s 
listed securities over a period of five years and comparing that return with the TSR for a broad 
equity market index, even if the company does not use TSR as a measure of performance for its 
share schemes. The performance graph is designed to make it easier to assess whether a company’s 
remuneration  arrangements  have  aligned  executives’  interests  with  shareholders’  interests.  The 
reports must also show the name of the index selected and outline the reason for selecting it. 
Spanish corporate governance guidelines require that the remuneration policy statement be 
accompanied  by  an  estimate  of  the  total  remuneration  which  is  paid  following  the  meeting  of 
performance benchmarks. Remuneration policies should also include technical safeguards to ensure 
that performance-related awards reflect the professional performance of the beneficiaries and not 
simply reflect general market or industry performance.  
Legislation and best practice guidelines rarely make provision for the ex-post evaluation of 
performance  targets  (ex-post  evaluation  provides  a  means  for  remedying  faulty  variable  pay 
structures). But ex-post valuation is addressed in the French and Dutch recommendations. These 
stipulate that the disclosure of the criteria on the basis of which variable remuneration is determined 
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should also include how those criteria were applied as compared to what was forecast during the 
financial year and an indication as to whether the objectives have been reached.
142 The Spanish 
guidelines also recommend that firms disclose information on the relation between the remuneration 
obtained by executive directors and the company’s profits, or other measure of enterprise results, 
for the year in review.
143 
Greater  transparency  with  respect  to  all  remuneration  items  could  be  supported  by 
requirements  for  standardised  tabular  reporting.  But  only  UK  law
144  and  French  best  practice 
recommendations
145 address the format of remuneration disclosure, although, we suggest, greater 
standardisation would enhance the clarity of remuneration disclosure.
146 The Commission, however, 
intends  to  explore  greater  standardisation.
147  The  standardisation  of  key  definitions  would  also 
eliminate  confusion  and  enhance  current  transparency  levels.
148  Furthermore,  placing  increased 
responsibility on (supervisory) boards in respect of remuneration matters might decrease the need 
for additional statutory provisions governing disclosure.
149 
 
3.5 Remuneration of non-executive directors 
The remuneration of non-executive directors deserves specific attention, particularly with 
respect to performance-related, share-based pay, given possible conflicts of interest and the risk of 
undermining  independence.  Member  States  adopt  varying  approaches  to  non-executive  director 
remuneration. The general rule applied by most Member States is that that these directors should 
not receive share-based remuneration. The Commission has also followed this principle in its 2009 
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information, independence. 
149 See statement of Gerhard Cromme, Chairman of the Government Commission of the German Corporate Governance 
Code, Press release, 6 June 2008. 46 
 
Recommendation.
150  This  approach  mitigates conflict  of  interests  risks,  particularly where  non-
executive directors are called on to evaluate accounting practices or to take other decisions with a 
possible bearing on the company’s reported earnings, given that such earnings or evaluations could 
have an impact on their income. Conflicts may arise also in situations where non-executives sit on 
several  boards,  sometimes  within  a  peer  group,  and  share  incentives  are  linked  to  the  share 
performance  of  these  companies.  High  remuneration  for  non-executive  directors  may  also 
jeopardise their independence.  
But  Member  State  regulation  varies.  Some  Member  States  allow  performance-based 
compensation to non-executives. In Germany and Austria the chairman of the board is generally 
granted double the amount paid to the other members. Differences in remuneration between board 
members are also allowed, according to the tasks directors carry out. Both countries allow for share-
based payment to non-executives, including stock options granted on a contingent capital increase 
or  based  on  companies’  own  shares.  The  German  Code  recommends  that  compensation  of  the 
members of the supervisory board should include performance-related compensation based on the 
long-term performance of the enterprise, but it is not clear that this is allowed under company law. 
The admissibility of so-called phantom stocks (to be paid in cash) as a means of stock price-related 
remuneration  for  members  of  the  supervisory  board  is  also  questionable.  However,  failing  any 
pertinent  decisions  by  German  courts,  most  commentators  are  willing  to  accept  this  type  of 
remuneration for members of the supervisory board. 
Spanish law stipulates that directors’ remuneration should be equal for all directors, unless 
the  opposite  is  expressly  stated  in  the  company  by-laws.  While  it  recommends  that  variable 
remuneration be confined to executive directors, share-based remuneration is excluded from this 
limitation, as long as directors are obliged to retain the shares until the end of their tenure.
151 Danish 
corporate governance recommends that members of the supervisory board do not receive share 
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options, but allows for bonus schemes and for remuneration in the form of shares (at their market 
price). In Hungary, non-executive directors may be awarded share-based remuneration, but they 
cannot be awarded stock options.
152 But several countries do not address the remuneration of non-
executive directors. 
Some Member State regulations set limitations on different types of remuneration for board 
members, especially where remuneration is related to a certain percentage of the company’s profits. 
For example, under  Spanish company law, if directors’ remuneration is based on a profit sharing 
scheme, payments can only be made where there are liquid profits and the reserves (by law or in the 
company by-laws) are fully covered and the shareholders are given a dividend of 4% or higher, 
where this is fixed in the by-laws. The Portuguese Commercial Companies’ Code requires that the 
global percentage of the profits allocated for directors’ variable remuneration, which is set in the 
articles of association, must exclude the amounts allocated to company reserves as well as any part 
of  the  profit  that  cannot  be  distributed  to  shareholders.
153  Similarly,  Greek  rules  provide  that 
payments to board members made out of net profits must be limited to the amount remaining after 
all reserves have been retained and the “first” (compulsory) dividend amounting of 35% of the net 
profits has been paid.
154 
The granting of loans to members of the supervisory board, which can generate conflicts of 
interest, is generally (where such statements are found in regulations) not permitted by regulations, 
unless on terms applicable to employees as a whole and after approval by the supervisory board. 
Some  Member  States,  however,  permit  such  loans  (e.g.  Germany,  Luxembourg,  Spain  and 
Poland)
155. 
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153 Portuguese Commercial Companies’ Code, Art. 399/2, Art. 429.  
154 Codified Law 2190/1920, Art. 24. 
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3.6 Design  
Regulation  across  the  Member  States  includes  various  guidelines  for  the  design  of 
remuneration packages. Because of their importance in the remuneration process and the significant 
differences in approach by Member State regulations, this section outlines the provisions related to 
the terms of contracts of executive directors and the guidelines for incentive pay. 
  
Terms of contracts 
The  setting  of  term  limits  for  contracts  for  executive  and  non-executive  directors  is 
important for linking reward with performance and for controlling rewards for failure. But only 
some Member States have adopted limits for executive directors’ service contracts and limits on 
termination payments are rare. 
  UK  best  practice  recommendations  (under  the  Combined  Code)  provide  that  notice  or 
contract periods  should be set at one year or less; longer periods are unusual. Austrian and German 
corporate law states that members of the management board are to be appointed by the supervisory 
board for a period not exceeding five years. The maximum period of the contract is also five years.  
In single-tier continental companies, requirements covering terms of contracts for directors 
theoretically apply to both executive and non-executive directors. At Italian firms, board directors 
cannot be appointed for a period exceeding three years; the appointment may be renewed where 
permitted in the articles of association and directors may be removed at any time by the general 
meeting (as they can be under UK company law), with no loss of entitlement to damages in case of 
unfair dismissal.
156 French law requires that board directors’ service contracts must not exceed six 
years.
157 The second Viénot report, however, recommends that the duration of the directors' term of 
office should not exceed a maximum of four years, in order to enable the shareholders to rule upon 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
provisions and the amounts which were paid back. These information have to be provided globally (for consolidated 
accounts, Art. 337 13°, LSC 1915; for annual accounts, Art. 65 (1) 13° of the Law of December 19, 2002 on the 
Commercial registrar and the accounting and annual accounts of businesses). There is not a specific prohibition in Spain 
about this subject. The general one is related with the loans directed to acquire the shares of the company. 
156 Italian Civil Code, art. 2383 
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their  appointment  with  sufficient  frequency.
158  Directors  of  Spanish  listed  companies  have  a 
maximum term limit of six years, but they can be re-elected without limit.
159 The Spanish Unified 
Code establishes that independent directors should not stay on as such for a continuous period of 
more than twelve years.
160  
In  Denmark  and  Portugal  members  of  the  board  of  directors  are  elected  by the general 
meeting for a period stipulated in the company’s articles of association and for a period no longer 
than four years. In Poland, members of the management board, by law, may serve for a maximum 
period of five years; there are no specific rules concerning disclosure of contracts. In Member States 
where directors have an employment contract governed by labour law, termination of the work 
contract can only be  made as provided in the contract and as permitted by law.
161  Most other 
Member States do not stipulate any specific requirements concerning directors’ service contracts 
with respect to the duration and disclosure.
162 
In  the  UK,  disclosure  concerning  termination  payments  policy,  notice  periods  and  the 
duration  of  directors’  service  contracts  must  be  made  in  the  Directors’  Remuneration  Report 
together with disclosure concerning payments made to directors (for breach of service contracts) in 
the relevant financial year; termination payments will be related to the director’s service contract. 
Remuneration committees are recommended (under the Combined Code) to ‘carefully consider’  
the impact of early termination in terms of compensation pay-outs and to avoid rewarding poor 
performance; they are recommended to ‘take a robust line’ on reducing compensation to reflect the 
departing director’s duty to mitigate losses. Dutch best practice guidelines provide for termination 
payments that do not exceed one year’s fixed salary; however, if this is considered unreasonable for 
a management board member who is dismissed during his first term of office, the severance pay 
should not exceed twice the annual salary. 
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159 Spanish Companies Act, art. 126.2. 
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In  Germany,  payments  to  management  board  members  on  premature  termination  of 
contracts  without  serious  cause  must  not  exceed  the  value  of  two  years’  compensation  (the 
‘severance payment cap’) and, in the event of a change in control, payment must not exceed 150% 
of the severance payment cap. French regulation on termination payments introduces an element 
that is not found in any other regime. French law imposes total transparency and makes termination 
payments conditional on performance requirements.
 163 Furthermore, it does not allow rewards to be 
made to failing executive directors. A termination payment cap of two years of compensation, 
including fixed and variable components, also applies. 
  According to the Belgian guidelines, severance payments should not exceed one year’s basic 
and  variable  remuneration.  The  board  may  consider  higher  severance  pay  but  further  to  a 
recommendation by the remuneration committee, and such pay should be limited to a maximum of 
eighteen  months  remuneration.  The  contract  should  specify  that  the  severance  package  should 
neither take account of variable remuneration nor exceed twelve months’ basic remuneration if the 
departing  CEO  or  executive  manager  did  not  meet  the  performance  criteria  referred  to  in  the 
contract. 
Some states do not have any specific rules regarding termination payments. For example, in 
Austria,  contracts  signed  by  the  management  board’s  members  are  so  called  ‘free  services 
contracts’ (Freie Dienstversträge) and generally neither labour law nor collective agreements are 
applicable to them. Management board members are explicitly excluded by law from the scope of 
general agreements. Disclosure of severance payments is not always enforced by regulations. In 
Germany, the substantive content of severance awards for management board members is disclosed 
only if, in legal terms, the awards differ significantly from the awards granted to employees. 
Capping severance pay to a certain number of years of annual remuneration may create 
some room within which companies can manoeuvre and remove underperforming directors without 
excessive  cost.  Currently,  there  are  significant  variations  between  companies  that  set  limits  on 
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severance pay limit. In particular, we suggest that clarity is necessary in Community and Member 
State regulation as to what annual remuneration (against which termination payments are assessed)  
refers to, whether: i) fixed annual pay; or ii) fixed + annual bonus; or iii) fixed + bonus + share-
based payment. At EU level, the 2009 Recommendations provide for termination payments to be 
based on maximum two years of the non-variable component of remuneration or the equivalent 
thereof. Additionally, the Recommendations state that termination payments should be linked with 
performance.
164 
 
Incentive pay 
An important area of the remuneration framework relates to guidelines for incentive pay. 
Different  approaches  have  been  adopted  across  the  Member  States  in  this  area.  Share-based 
remuneration schemes, in particular, tend to attract best practice recommendations. 
Schedule A of the UK Combined Code states that, in normal circumstances, shares granted 
or other forms of deferred remuneration should not vest, and options should not be exercisable, in 
less than three years. Directors should be encouraged to hold their shares for a further period after 
vesting  or  exercise,  subject  to  the  need  to  finance  any  costs  of  acquisition  and  associated  tax 
liabilities. Grants under executive share option and other long-term incentive schemes should be 
phased  rather  than  awarded  in  one  large  block.  The  total  rewards  potentially  available  under 
incentive  schemes  should  not  be  “excessive”.  The  Combined  Code  further  recommends  that 
performance criteria for incentive scheme payments should be “challenging”; and that consideration 
should  be  given  to the use  of  performance  criteria  which  measure  the  company’s  performance 
relative to comparator companies in some key variables, including Total Shareholder Return (TSR). 
Share-based schemes have also been addressed by leading institutional investor organisations. The 
ABI Guidelines state that remuneration committees should have regard to dilution effects.
165 The 
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NAPF Guidelines state that the board’s assessment of the total value of rewards granted to directors 
should  be  made  available  and  that  directors  should  ideally  only  participate  in  one  share  based 
incentive scheme at a time.
166 
In  Germany,  where  extraordinary,  unforeseen  developments  occur  it  is  possible  to  limit  
long-term incentives, upon the agreement of the supervisory board. Other requirements include that 
the grant of new shares to members of the management board is dependent on the nominal value of 
the contingent capital not being greater than ten percent of the registered share capital available at 
the time of the relevant resolution. The waiting period prior to the initial exercise of the subscription 
rights / options is two years.  
In France, with respect to share option schemes, boards of directors or management boards 
should prohibit the immediate resale of all or part of any shares granted for a particular period (the 
‘custody period’), which period may not exceed three years from the date of exercise of the option. 
For bonus shares, the minimum term of the vesting period (or period at the end of which the vesting 
of the shares is final) may not be less than two years, while the minimum term of the custody period 
may not be less than two years from the final award date. However, the custody period may be 
reduced or removed by the general meeting if the meeting has also approved a vesting period at 
least equal to four years for all or part of the awarded shares. The total number of shares awarded 
free of charge may not exceed 10% of the share capital as of the date of the award made by the 
board of directors or the management board. Additionally, no bonus share award may be made to 
employees or officers individually holding more than 10% of the share capital. 
In  Belgium  and  Luxembourg  the  specific  rules  include  that  shares  should  not  vest  and 
options should not be exercisable within less than three years. In the Netherlands options should not 
be exercised in the first three years after the date of granting, and shares granted without financial 
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consideration must be retained for a period of at least five years, or until at least the end of the 
employment, if this period is shorter.  
 
3.7 New regulatory issues 
The financial crisis has led to particular rules being adopted across the Member States for  
remuneration within banks and has led to regulators and supervisors becoming more involved in the 
banking remuneration system. As described above in this Section, the Commission has adopted new 
general  principles  applicable  to  remuneration  policy  in  the  financial  services  sector  which  are 
designed to ensure that financial institutions have remuneration policies in place for risk-taking staff 
that are consistent with and promote effective risk management.  
Even before the financial crisis deepened in late 2008, however, several banking-specific 
provisions  were  already  in  place  in  some  Member  States.  For  example,  according  to 
Luxembourgish company law, the banking supervisory authority could recommend a reduction of 
the  remuneration  of  the  board  of  a  listed  bank,  as  a  whole,  if  it  deemed  such  remuneration 
disproportionate to the bank’s size, activities, profits and to the time directors spent on performing 
their duties. The Bank of Italy issued specific corporate governance guidelines for banks in March 
2008,
167 including with respect to remuneration policy, implementing the EU Recommendations. 
This is the first such document addressed to the banking sector immediately after the financial crisis 
hit the markets and as concerns about the health of the financial system were raised. 
As the crisis deepened and as remuneration became linked, in the policy debate, to the 
financial crisis, a series of reforms and reviews were adopted across the Member States and by the 
EU in an attempt to design a better regulatory framework for director remuneration. Such reforms 
have been initiated by regulators and politicians with particular regard to financial firms, to prevent 
a recurrence of the ‘credit crunch’.
168 Overall, these reforms seem to impose  more responsibility on 
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the  (supervisory)  board  for  directors’  remuneration.  Whilst  measures  designed  to  align 
remuneration  with  effective  risk  management  have  been  required  for  financial  institutions  in 
particular,  provisions  for  an  increased  role  for  the  board,
169  clawbacks,  golden  parachutes  and 
compensation’s adjustment to risks, all with broader relevance for remuneration policy, have also 
emerged. All these areas are, for example, covered in the two 2009 EC Recommendations.  
 
Board responsibility  
The amendments to the Dutch Code of Corporate Governance in 2008 well illustrate the 
increased  responsibility  being  placed  on  the  supervisory  board.  Supervisory  boards  are  given 
instruments for improving the quality of decision-making on remuneration and the transparency of 
the remuneration structure. The basic concept is that management board members should earn their 
remuneration on the basis of performance, but that it is ultimately for the supervisory board to 
determine  how  much  it  would  be  reasonable  for  a  management  board  member  to  earn,  taking 
account of all the circumstances. The active involvement of the shareholders is also essential in this 
respect.  Before  determining  the  remuneration  of  management  board  members,  the  supervisory 
board  should  analyse  the  possible  outcomes  of  the  variable  components  of  remuneration.  The 
supervisory  board  then  determines  the  level  and  structure  of  the  remuneration  by  reference  to 
scenario  analyses,  taking  account  not  only  of  results  and  share  price  but  also  of  non-financial 
indicators.
170 The Government Commission on the German Corporate Governance Code also made 
a number of substantive amendments to the Cromme Code in 2008. One of the main reforms was to 
strengthen  the  competence  and  responsibility  of  the  full  supervisory  board  in  respect  of 
remuneration.
171  
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It has also been advocated that non-executive directors should have the discretion to change 
actual remuneration, ex-post, to ensure that the total pay executive directors receive is ‘fair’ in 
relation  to  the  company's  results  and  the  personal  performance  of  management
172;  any  related 
adjustment to the operation of established remuneration schemes would be fully disclosed. But only 
the  Dutch  corporate  governance  guidelines  empower  the  supervisory  board  to  adjust  variable 
remuneration  downwards  or  upwards.  In  support  of  boards’  discretion  to  change  executive 
remuneration,  the  role  of  the  remuneration  committee  needs,  however,  to  extend  from  making 
proposals for the remuneration policy, to ‘performance reviewing’, i.e. carrying out an assessment 
of the remuneration levels against performance criteria and assessing the appropriateness of the 
remuneration policy. 
 
Risks of variable remuneration  
Variable remuneration may expose the enterprise to various risks. Regulators, as well as 
banking  institutions,  are  now  focusing  on  the  risk  which  remuneration  poses  to  overall  firm 
financial stability and risk management, and to systemic stability, and are exploring ways to make 
variable pay better reflect risk and long-term performance. For example, the FSA is concerned with 
the risks created by the structure, and not with the absolute amount, of remuneration; it regards the 
latter as a matter for firms’ remuneration committees. But its general principle is that a firm should 
establish,  implement  and  maintain  remuneration  policies,  procedures  and  practices  that  are 
consistent  with  and  promote  effective  risk  management.
173  The  FSA  stance  reflects  a  growing 
consensus in the industry that pay for bankers should be adjusted for the risks they take when 
betting their companies’ capital.  
As  yet,  EU  Member  State  regulations  have  not  implemented  specific  measures  on  the 
relationship between remuneration and risk-taking. The better alignment of remuneration with a 
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firm’s risk profile had, however, been raised by the supervisory provisions drawn-up by the Bank of 
Italy specifically for the Italian banking system in 2008
174, before the deepening crisis woke policy 
makers up to the issue. The Italian provisions require that remuneration schemes must not conflict 
with banks’ prudent risk management policies or their long-term strategy. In particular, equity-
based incentives (e.g. stock options) or performance-linked pay must take account of the risk borne 
by banks and be structured so as to avoid generating incentives that conflict with their long-term 
interests. 
Across the Atlantic, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (2008, so-called “TARP 
bill”) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009, so-called “stimulus bill”) require 
firms receiving TARP funds to ban incentives that take “unnecessary and excessive risks”. The 
effectiveness of these measures have been argued.
175 
Remuneration practices can encourage excessive risks across all industries, however, and the 
reform movement should focus more widely on ensuring that incentives do not induce risk-taking 
which is in excess of a firm’s risk appetite or tolerance. 
 
Clawback provisions  
The financial crisis has also seen attention turn to clawing back remuneration.
176 Clawback 
provisions are rarely found in current Member State regulations. But clawbacks have, nonetheless, 
become associated with the financial crisis remuneration reform movement.
177 Typically, under a  
clawback clause, and to the extent possible under applicable employment laws and companies’ 
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legislation, the company should reserve the right, at the discretion of non-executive directors, to 
reclaim performance-linked remuneration elements which were paid to directors on the basis of 
results that afterwards were found to have been significantly misstated because of wrongdoing or 
malpractice.
178 This requirement currently exists only in the amended Dutch Code, probably thanks 
to its adoption in the middle of the financial crisis. The Dutch clawback provisions suggests that the 
supervisory board be able to recover from management board members any variable remuneration 
which was awarded on the basis of incorrect financial or other data.
179 
 
4. RESEARCH ON COMPANIES 
 
4.1. Explanation of data 
Our dataset consists of Europe’s largest 300 listed firms by market capitalisation.
180  295 
firms have been examined; the remaining 5 did not provide the necessary material for the analysis. 
The firms are situated in 16 European countries, of which 14 are EU countries and 2 are non-EU 
countries.
181 Table 1 shows the distribution of firm observations across the 16 countries included in 
our sample.  
The  analysis  was  conducted  on the  annual  financial  statements  or  corporate  governance 
reports – where separate from annual reports – for the financial year ending December 2007 or 
March 2008. The data accordingly reflects firms’ remuneration policies for the period just before 
the crisis occurred. 
Our  disclosure  analysis  covers  23  criteria  related  to  the  disclosure  of  directors’ 
remuneration. These criteria are further classified in 8 categories, namely: remuneration committee, 
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remuneration statement, terms of contracts, preparatory and decision-making process, remuneration 
policy information, individual disclosure, emoluments and share-incentive schemes. The criteria 
were chosen as they provide an insight into the behaviour of firms relating to the disclosure of 
directors’  remuneration  across  three  areas:  governance,  remuneration  policy  and  individual 
remuneration disclosure. In setting the criteria we followed the specific provisions stated in the 
2004-2005 EC Recommendations and covered in most international best practice guidelines. Annex 
1 provides explanations for the evaluation of all criteria. For each criterion we assess whether a firm 
attains a minimum level of implementation.  
The 23 criteria use a Degree of Conformity (DoC) measuring the extent to which companies 
follow international guidelines for the presentation and disclosure of directors’ remuneration. We 
assign a value of “1” to each criterion that a firm complies with and “0” otherwise. All criteria were 
given the same weight. If the firm does not provide information on a criterion we do not exclude it 
from the computation but give each missing criterion a score of 0, effectively treating it as if the 
firm does not conform with the respective disclosure criteria. The DoC can be assessed : 
i)  at a general level, comprising all firms from our dataset: expressed in percentages, or in 
number of points (max DoC = 295); 
ii)  at country level: expressed in percentages or in number of points (max DoC = number of 
observations (firms)); 
iii) at firm level: expressed in values assigned (0 or 1 / criteria).  
In this section we present an overview of European firms’ behaviour in practice with respect 
to remuneration governance and disclosure. Because the results show homogeneity within countries 
and variations between firms in different countries, the comments refer to country-specific firm 
behaviour. Overall, we observe that firms’ application of the different disclosure criteria depends on 
the level of transposition of the Commission’s 2004 and 2005 Recommendations in the different 
Member States and, moreover, on the way these recommendations are applied: through mandatory 
legislative provisions or through best practice guidelines. Law accordingly ‘matters’. 59 
 
Table 2 provides an overview of the 23 criteria, categories and areas showing firms’ overall 
DoC for each of these. The results show that some criteria are followed by the majority of firms. 
For example, four of the criteria are fulfilled by over 80 percent of our sample: one of the two 
criteria in the area of governance, two of the thirteen criteria in the area of remuneration policy and 
one out of the eight criteria in the area of individual disclosure. The criteria meeting the highest 
scores  are  related  to  general  disclosure  requirements  i.e.  disclosure  on  the  presence  of  a 
remuneration committee, the existence of a policy statement and the individual disclosure of non-
executive directors. The criteria that receive the lowest percentage of conformity relate to detailed 
disclosure requirements, such as the adoption of a forward-looking approach in the remuneration 
statement,  disclosure  of  terms  of  contracts,  disclosure  of  the  names  of  external  consultants, 
information on the link between remuneration and performance and details of the share-incentive 
schemes. 
The empirical distribution of criteria is displayed in table 3. We observe that firms tend to 
place the highest importance on basic disclosure requirements, represented by criteria such as the 
existence of the remuneration committee, the existence of a remuneration policy and individual 
disclosure of emoluments; while requirements for more detailed information relating to directors’ 
terms  of  contracts  and  qualitative  information  regarding  the  performance-linked  compensation 
generate lower interest. Figures 1 and 2 also reveal the substantial differences in disclosure on 
remuneration between firms in our sample. 
 
4.2 Remuneration Committee 
As part of the analysis of the governance of the remuneration process, we checked for the 
presence  of  a  dedicated  remuneration  committee  within  boards,  composed  of  non-executive, 60 
 
directors, in the majority independent, as required by the 2005 Recommendation on the role of non-
executive directors.
182 
Our  assessment  shows  that  almost  83%  of  the  firms  reviewed  have  established  either 
separate or joined committees. But only 60% of all firms have remuneration committees composed 
of non-executive, in the majority independent, directors. Reflecting the pan-EU governance divide, 
variations occur mostly between jurisdictions, whilst conformity with criteria within each country is 
quite homogenous. Remuneration committees (either separate or joined) are to be found at all firms 
from the UK, the Netherlands, Ireland and Portugal. The countries where the lowest number of 
firms have remuneration committees are Germany, Denmark and Austria. Firms from Belgium, 
Spain, Sweden, Greece and Norway have the lowest compliance with the requirement regarding 
committee’s composition. Nearly all UK firms reviewed set up dedicated remuneration committees. 
Several Dutch firms also have separate remuneration committees; some have established joined 
nomination and remuneration committees. UK and Dutch firms also comply with the composition 
requirements. In France, most firms have joint nomination and remuneration committees, whilst the 
majority of Italian firms have dedicated remuneration committees. Greek and Norwegian firms have 
set up remuneration committees but they do not fulfill the independence criteria. German firms do 
not have separate remuneration committees; in most cases, other committees (most often human 
resources committee) have been delegated the responsibility for senior management remuneration 
and information regarding the independency of their members is not given.  
Firms’  approach  to  governance  generally  follows  their  national  corporate  governance 
requirements.  As  revealed  by  our  research  on  regulations  and  by  the  Commission’s  report  on 
implementation of the 2005 Recommendation,
183 the majority of Member States require the creation 
of remuneration committees; however, not all Member States have implemented the requirements 
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of the Recommendation on the presence and number of independent directors in the committee and 
this is reflected in firm practice. 
Whether  a  totally  dedicated  committee,  addressing  remuneration  alone,  ensures  optimal 
remuneration governance is questionable. Committees are supposed to devote full attention to their 
tasks, whether it is auditing, directors’ nomination or remuneration. On the other hand, merging the 
remuneration and nomination functions may provide co-operation and information efficiencies and 
provide  important  inputs  to  the  evaluation  and  rewarding  process.  In  the  end,  the  corporate 
governance framework of each firm should be decided by each firm, taking into account its overall 
responsibility, structure and strategy. The independence requirement, however, is more sensitive, 
because the remuneration itself is a sensitive argument, prone to conflicts of interest. As the main 
tasks  of  the  remuneration  committee  concern  the  submission  of  proposals  on  individual 
remuneration and on suitable contracts for executive directors and top management, the presence of 
executive representatives in such committees would undermine its activity. The determination of 
the independence criteria varies, however, across countries’ best practices codes.
184 But whatever 
the  standard  adopted,  compliance  with  the  independence  criterion  in  practice  then  becomes 
essential.   
 
4.3 Remuneration policy 
The precise coverage of a company’s remuneration policy is not well defined by national 
regulations. This is also clear from the disclosure practices adopted by firms, which apply local 
requirements in different ways. The remuneration policy could be understood as a detailed account 
of  individual  remuneration,  company  remuneration  principles  and  the  remuneration  process.  In 
practice,  most  regulations  and  codes  that  transposed  the  2004  Recommendation  on  directors’ 
remuneration  require  a  clear  and  comprehensive  overview  of  the  remuneration  policy,  which 
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enables shareholders to evaluate the company’s approach to remuneration and to debate the policy 
where necessary.  
Our  analysis  assesses  the  remuneration  policy  area  with  respect  to  four  categories:  the 
remuneration  statement,  contracts  terms  for  executive  directors,  the  preparatory  and  decision-
making process and the information contained in the remuneration statement.  
 
Remuneration statement 
Under the 2004 Recommendation, the remuneration policy must firstly contain a statement 
which provides an overview of the principles governing remuneration for the year in review.
185 
Where firms provide an independent remuneration report, the statement is, of course, part of this 
report. If, as is most often the case, firms do not have a separate remuneration report, the statement 
can be included in the annual accounts or the respective notes.  The statement must provide an 
overview of the manner in which the remuneration policy has been implemented in the year in 
review, explaining any changes that have occurred during the year.
186  More than 90% of the firms 
have  a  remuneration  statement  in  their  report.  However,  we  find  great  differences  in  the 
presentation of the remuneration statement. At the lowest level of disclosure, firms present a rather 
boilerplate statement, with insufficient bespoke coverage. At the upper level, firms provide clear 
principles and guidelines on their remuneration policy, including details of any recent changes or 
future changes. If we were to evaluate the quality and clarity of the statement, we would allocate 
low scores to the majority of firms from Continental Europe; however this is not an assessment we 
undertake in the present study. 
In  addition,  the  statement  should  also  focus  on  the  company’s  policy  on  directors’ 
remuneration for the following year and subsequent years
187. Although this must be approached 
with  caution  because  policy  evolves  over  time,  this  requirement  is  essential  for  board 
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accountability. Nonetheless, few national regulations have transposed this requirement and even 
fewer firms have applied it. This failure is likely to become the focus of future reforms, considering 
the risk associated with the remuneration levels of firms’ top management. Our research reveals that 
only UK and Dutch firms achieve a higher than 50% conformity with this criterion. Most other 
firms do not conform with this criteria at all.  
Overall, the remuneration statement category is fulfilled by 70% of the firms. 
 
Terms of contract 
The  terms  of  contracts  for  executive  directors,  including  the  duration  of  contracts,  the 
applicable  notice  period  and  details  of  provisions  for  termination  payments,  form  part  of  the 
remuneration policy and must be disclosed in the statement. Shareholders can take account of these 
contracts and the way in which they are implemented in considering their vote on the remuneration 
policy. Best practice guidelines typically provide that when contracts are being negotiated, boards 
should  consider  and  avoid  the  reputational  risks  of  being  obliged  to  make  large  payments  to 
executives  who  have  failed  to  perform.  Contracts  should  also  be  reviewed  periodically  and 
remuneration committees should consider, and stakeholders assess, whether the contract provisions 
are in line with their policy and the disclosed statement.
188  
Overall, and despite its importance to effective governance and shareholder voice and the 
extent of the ‘rewards for failure’ which the crisis has exposed, this category meets the lowest DoC, 
approximately 45%. In several cases where only partial information is disclosed, it is provided in 
sections of the annual report that are not linked to the remuneration statement, and is rather unclear. 
Nearly  all  UK  firms  and  most  Dutch  and  Swedish  firms,  however,  consolidate  all  information 
relating  to  the  terms  of  contracts  in  the  remuneration  statement.  In  other  cases,  the  terms  of 
directors’ contract are often understood by companies as related to general corporate governance 
issues and hence  are  disclosed  with  board  practices  generally.  However,  we  argue  that  service 
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contracts disclosure should be linked to remuneration policy and disclosed in the remuneration 
statement. Accordingly, we assessed all firms on an equal playing field, without penalising the ones 
that might have this information. 
Disclosure of firm policy on termination payments is provided by 61% of all firms and it is 
often disclosed separately from the duration of contracts. More than 70% firms from Sweden, the 
UK, the Netherlands and Portugal provide some disclosure on policy on termination payments, 
while  less  than  30%  of  firms  from  Switzerland,  Italy,  Austria  and  Norway  provide  such 
information. Because one needs to have an overview of the general policy on termination payments, 
we penalise firms that only give information on the CEO termination contract instead of a general 
policy applied to all executive directors. 
 
Preparatory and decision-making process 
Information regarding the preparatory and decision-making process used for determining the 
company’s  remuneration  policy  for  directors  should  also  be  disclosed  in  the  remuneration 
statement.
189  In  line  with  the  Commission’s  Recommendations,  we  assess  the  disclosure  of 
information concerning the mandate and composition of the remuneration committee, disclosure 
concerning external  remuneration consultants and  disclosure  concerning  the  role  of  the  general 
meeting  of  shareholders  in  the  process.  As  with  disclosure  concerning  the  terms  of  contracts, 
disclosure  on  the  process  for  setting-up  remuneration  assists  shareholders  in  understanding  the 
company’s remuneration policy and in gauging the appropriateness of the levels of compensation. 
This category is best followed by UK firms and, with significantly lower levels of conformity, by 
Dutch, Swedish, Irish and Portuguese firms.  
With the exception of UK firms, most European firms provide the remuneration statement 
and the information related to the remuneration committee separately, with the latter often found in 
the general corporate governance report / section.  This reflects national reporting requirements. We 
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find, however, that process disclosure is an important element of remuneration governance which 
should  be  disclosed  as  part  of  the  remuneration  statement,  together  with  the  other  information 
which describes the process for setting remuneration. This reform should be made through Member 
State regulation, even if it requires a duplication of disclosures already required for the corporate 
governance report. Our research in this area produced two results: the first analysis did not penalise 
firms that disclosed the information elsewhere in the annual accounts; the second only considered 
disclosures made in the remuneration statement. In the first situation, 75% of firms disclosed the 
information, with most countries achieving overall scores higher than 80%.
190 Austrian and Danish 
firms have the lowest conformity levels. In the second situations, where we penalised firms if the 
information was dissociated from the remuneration statement; only 30% of all firms (mainly UK 
firms) conformed.  
The names of external remuneration consultants are disclosed by only 33% of firms, mostly 
UK firms. Several Spanish firms state that they do not use a remuneration consultant. Where the 
information was missing, we assumed that firms make use of consultants, but do not disclose this 
information.  The  role  of  the  general  meeting  of  shareholders  in  the  remuneration  process  is 
disclosed  by  almost  70%  of  the  firms.  But  less  information  is  provided  by  German,  Austrian, 
Norwegian and Finnish firms, where the role of shareholders in the remuneration process is weaker. 
Generally (as noted in section 3 above), the role of the general meeting in the remuneration process 
consists in setting the remuneration levels for the supervisory board and approving the remuneration 
policy and the share-based remuneration schemes. But disclosure on shareholders’ role is generally 
unclear across the firms reviewed. 
 
 
 
                                                            
190 German firms do not have such information because they do not have remuneration committees, but instead they 
allocate  responsibilities  for  directors’  remuneration  to  human  resources  or  personnel  committees  undertake  the 
responsibility for the directors’ remuneration process. 66 
 
Alignment of remuneration with performance 
As outlined earlier, the degree of alignment of remuneration with performance is regarded as 
an  essential  measure  for  evaluating  the  appropriateness  of  a  company’s  remuneration  policy. 
Disclosure plays a major role in assisting shareholders (and other stakeholders) in assessing the 
‘relative  importance’  of  the  variable  and  non-variable  components  of  directors’  remuneration. 
Shareholders  and  policy  makers  can  use  disclosure  to  evaluate  the  appropriateness  of  firms’ 
remuneration policy, linking it to the remuneration process and compensation levels. However, the 
concept of ‘relative importance’, frequently used by regulators, is rather vague. Companies often 
express ‘relative importance’ as a comparison of the relative values of ‘fixed’ remuneration (e.g. 
salary) and variable remuneration (such as bonus, options and LTIS awards). Corporate governance 
guidelines  often  recommend  a  ‘proper  balance’  between  base  pay  and  variable  pay
191  or  that 
remuneration  be  linked  to  performance  by  means  of    a  relatively  low  base  pay  and  a  higher 
proportion of variable pay.
192 Approximately 55% of firms provide an explanation as to the balance  
between the different elements of remuneration, although the depth of disclosure varies.  
Most UK firms provide details on the breakdown between fixed remuneration and annual 
incentives and between fixed remuneration and other long-term incentives, often also disclosing the 
minimum as well as the maximum levels for these incentives payments. Several UK firms also 
present these proportionate disclosures, in aggregate form,  as part of the total estimated annual pay. 
This type of disclosure facilitates a clear assessment of the estimated value of incentive payments as 
a proportion of total annual pay. Most other European firms that disclose the relative importance of 
fixed and incentive pay usually only refer to the relationship between base pay and annual bonuses. 
This more limited approach may be linked to the lack of disclosure on the value of share-incentive 
schemes, which we consider further below. Given that the Commission Recommendation (2004) 
does not specifically require disclosure of the balance between fixed and the different elements of 
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the variable remuneration, our assessment awards the DoC to firms which disclose only the relative 
importance of fixed remuneration and annual incentives (bonus). UK, Dutch, Swedish, Austrian and 
Portuguese companies rate highest in this criteria, while Spanish, Belgian, Italian, Irish and Danish 
firms have low conformity.  
Understanding the financial state of a firm and its forecasted performance, its strategy and 
its objectives is essential when evaluating a firm. An accurate assessment of the effectiveness of 
remuneration policy for directors accordingly must be linked with the financial and non-financial 
state of a firm. The remuneration statement should therefore set out sufficient information on the 
linkage between remuneration and performance, through disclosure of the performance criteria on 
which  bonus  and  share  schemes  are  based,  although  the  need  to  protect  the  disclosure  of 
commercially sensitive information must be acknowledged. This, however, should not be an excuse 
for not disclosing the parameters for the incentive component of remuneration. The low levels of 
disclosure which are clear from our analysis may be explained by firms considering performance 
targets to constitute commercially sensitive information. Firms that we assessed as in conformity in 
this  area,  by  contrast,  provided  details  on  performance  targets  for  both  annual  and  long-term 
incentive  schemes;  if  no  information  whatsoever  is  provided  on  long  term-incentive  schemes 
without making it clear whether such schemes are adopted, we assumed that the firm does not 
disclose this information. The level of disclosure of the link between remuneration and performance 
cannot be fully objective but, given market concerns, what is important is that an ex-post review of 
performance against targets is possible. 
Disclosure of the performance parameters for bonus schemes is provided by 64% of the 
firms in our data, while performance targets for share-based incentive schemes is provided by only 
56% of the firms. These disclosures are complemented by information (or the lack of it) on the 
achievement of  targets, such that in the end only 30% of firms provide sufficient information on the 
link between remuneration and performance. The highest levels of disclosure are provided by UK, 68 
 
Dutch and to some extent German firms, while Belgium, Spanish, Italian and Swiss firms are the 
lowest performers.  
Overall,  these  generally  moderate  levels  of  firm  disclosure  concerning  the  remuneration 
policy reflect local transposition of the 2004 Recommendation in the Member States. The EC’s 
assessment showed that implementation was generally variable and that the Recommendation was  
most  often  only  implemented  in  part.
193  The  Recommendation’s  detailed  requirements  have 
typically been implemented on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. 
 
4.4 Individual disclosure 
Adequate transparency depends on individualised disclosure of executive and non-executive 
remuneration, including a breakdown of salary/fees and short-term and long-term incentives. This 
way,  shareholders  and  wider  stakeholders  can  hold  individual  directors  accountable  for  the 
remuneration  they  have  earned;  but  this  assessment  is  accurate  only  if  all  the  components  of 
remuneration are disclosed individually, relative to the year in review and the preceding years. Our 
assessment indicates that 58% of all firms conform to all criteria in this area. 
We assess the level of disclosure of emoluments, i.e. the total amount of salary or board fees 
paid to the director under the year in review, the remuneration paid in the form of annual bonus and 
any additional benefits.
194 We observe that 74% of firms provide both executive and non-executive 
individual disclosure of emoluments and bonuses. The remuneration of non-executives is disclosed 
by a greater number of firms; however some companies disclose only with respect to non-executive 
or executive directors. Generalising firms’ behaviour within a country and observing the differences 
in  behaviour  between  countries,  we  notice  that  firms  tend  to  follow  domestic  regulation.  For 
example,  most  Swedish  and  Finnish  firms  disclose  individual  remuneration  of  non-executive 
directors and do not individually disclose the remuneration of executives. Conversely, Austrian 
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firms  provide  individual  disclosure  of  executive  remuneration  and  aggregate  figures  for  non-
executive remuneration. In most other countries, firms that only provide aggregate disclosure adopt 
this practice for both types of directorship. 
 Disclosure of the remuneration of individual directors of the company, executive and non-
executive, in the preceding years can help investors appreciate remuneration in light of the overall 
performance of the firm.
195  Nearly all UK and Irish firms, and about 71% of Dutch firms, disclose 
individual remuneration for the previous year. Almost half of French and Italian firms provide this 
information  as  well;  many  French  firms  also  provide  information  on  executive  remuneration 
received in the previous two or even three years. Most often following national regulations, several 
firms  provide  this  disclosure  only  for  executive  directors  and  are  therefore  penalised  by  our 
assessment.
196 In line with the Commission  Recommendation and several national guidelines, we 
consider  that  the  evolution  of  non-executive  remuneration  year-on-year  is  also  important  in 
evaluating board performance, as frequently the non-executive directors receive variable pay based 
on meeting attendance and, in several cases, based on  performance.
197 
We also evaluated the conformity of individual disclosure with respect to share schemes 
awards, including: share options granted, exercised, unexercised, exercise price, and exercise date. 
Details on share-incentive schemes are fully disclosed on an individual basis by 46% of firms. The 
majority of UK, Irish and Dutch firms, and around 40% of firms from Italy and France, provide 
disclosure on all required information. Companies in other Member States provide low levels of 
disclosure. Firms that report numerical details also generally provide explanations on the conditions 
of application of shares granted and exercised rights. Disclosure has, however, expanded following 
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the mandated expensing of stock options,
198 nonetheless clarity has not improved. This is mainly 
because certain details of long-term incentive schemes are not being disclosed.
199   
As with the area of remuneration governance and policy disclosure, individual disclosure of 
remuneration is a criterion fulfilled by the European firms only in part, reflecting the requirements 
set by Member State regulation. More stringent requirements have been put in place in this area 
since the 2004 Recommendation was adopted and, in most States, disclosure is required by law on a 
mandatory  basis.  However,  where  the  option  for  ‘comply  or  explain’  applies,  many  firms  still 
deviate from the rule, providing explanations for their approach (e.g. firms from Spain, Belgium, 
Austria, Portugal). 
  In addition to the 23 criteria considered above, we also assessed two criteria which, in our 
view, could strengthen the regulatory provisions: i) a criterion allowing us to observe the way in 
which the information related to remuneration is consolidated in the statement; ii) a criterion which 
analyses the use of benchmarks in the remuneration process. 
 
  4.5 Consolidation 
  Although our results indicate that the majority of firms have a remuneration statement in the 
annual report, the consolidation criterion was only poorly complied with by European firms; most 
companies  do not provide a consolidated remuneration report. Most Continental European firms do 
not engage in exhaustive reporting. Elements of the remuneration policy are scattered throughout 
the annual report. “A clear and comprehensive overview of the company’s remuneration”
200 has not 
been achieved by the majority of firms; this obstructs remuneration governance and assessment of 
the remuneration system adopted by the firm. UK firms produce remuneration reports; therefore the 
degree of consolidation is high, with a 94% of firms conforming to this additional criterion. Almost 
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80% of the German firms in our data-set produce a consolidated remuneration statement, while all 
other firms scatter the remuneration information throughout their annual reports. These fragmented 
remuneration reports may be interpreted as providing opaque and incomplete disclosure. Figure 9 in 
annex illustrates the degree of consolidation achieved by firms. 
   
  4.6 Benchmark peer group 
Using a benchmark peer group (related to a business sector and/or the European or global 
market) to assess remuneration policy and levels is considered best practice, yet it is recommended 
or required  by only a few national regimes.
201   
In practice, benchmarking the level of pay is a criterion found mostly in UK and Dutch 
remuneration reports; it is not common in other firms. Approximately 78% of UK and Dutch firms 
disclose a remuneration benchmark in the remuneration statement. An employment market peer 
group – not limited to national markets – can be an additional element in the process for setting the 
remuneration  for  both  executive  and  non-executive  directors.  It  can  act  as  reference  for  the 
remuneration levels of the (supervisory) board and support adequate alignment with the relevant 
market  and  ensure  that  remuneration  is  competitive  with  that  in  firms  of  similar  size  and 
complexity. The composition of the comparator group should be reviewed on a periodic basis to 
assure that its constituents reflect the company’s strategic orientation. Most commonly, the peer 
group used for measuring the TSR is different from the employment market peer group which is 
used  to  determine  remuneration  levels.  The  TSR  performance  assessment  measure,  against  a 
comparator group, is a performance benchmark and is not used to benchmark overall remuneration 
policy/level of remuneration. Benchmark disclosure poses risks however, in that, aligning directors’ 
remuneration with a peer group, combined with the practice of aiming to reward directors at the 
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median or upper quartile of such peer group, may bring upward pressure (“ratchet effect”) to bear 
on the remuneration market and lead to neglect of the relationship between remuneration and firms’ 
underlying performance. Recent reform proposals suggest that boards should not only benchmark 
the remuneration of executive directors externally but also internally against the remuneration of 
other employees within the company, in order to ensure a consistent and ‘fair’ remuneration policy 
throughout the company
202, however controversial a requirement this may be. 
 
4.7 Overall analysis 
The EC Recommendations allow Member States to adopt different local approaches. This 
has led to diverse interpretations due to a wide diversity of national transpositions which reflect 
local traditions, legislation and practices.
203 Our results in the three analysed areas support our 
observation that firms tend to apply only the basic requirements of national regulations, hence the 
significant  differences  in  the  application  of  disclosure  provisions.  Furthermore,  they  generally 
conform mainly to legally-binding rules and do not usually go beyond what is required by these 
rules.  Where  requirements  apply  a  ‘comply  or  explain’  basis,  firms  tend  to  follow  them  only 
partially.  
A  further  explanation  of  variations  in  the  application  of  the  governance  and  disclosure 
principles  reflects  the  persistent  differences  in  corporate  ownership  across  Europe.  Ownership 
structures have clear effects on corporate governance in general; one of the most striking features of 
executive  remuneration  is  its  reflection  of  the  interaction  between  remuneration  and  corporate 
governance  or  ownership  structures.
204  In  the  case  of  concentrated  ownership  companies, 
controlling  shareholders  can  monitor  management  directly  without  the  need  for  an  incentive 
contract; therefore remuneration controls can be less sophisticated. In dispersed ownership systems, 
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on the other hand, shareholders are less able to monitor management and have more demanding 
disclosure requirements. Legal controls on pay in these systems tend to be more sophisticated and 
the responsibility of non-executive directors becomes more acute. In theory, this stimulates better 
disclosure practices by firms with dispersed ownership structures. Controlling shareholders will, 
however,  continue  to  play  a  dominant  role  in  Europe,  despite  the  increase  in  the  number  of 
European firms listing on stock markets
205; this is reflected in our findings. We note that UK, 
Ireland, and the Netherlands – traditionally countries with dispersed ownership firms – meet higher 
levels  of  disclosure  practices,  while  firms  from  Belgium,  Spain  and,  to  some  extent,  Italy 
(traditionally block-holding systems) – achieve lower levels of disclosure.  
Table 4 displays individual countries’ overall DoC and provides a breakdown of the three 
areas considered in our analysis. We observe that most countries achieve the highest scores in the 
governance area, which is represented by the establishment of the remuneration committee. German 
firms perform better in the individual disclosure area. Firms from the UK, Netherlands, Denmark, 
Norway and Finland behave similarly within all three areas. Rather surprising is the fact that the 
lowest levels of conformity occur with respect to individual disclosure. While we find a certain 
level  of  homogeneity  in  disclosure  behaviour,  there  are  still  some  variations  in  the  criteria 
concerned.   
We  also  calculated  the  empirical  distribution  of  countries’  results.  Tables  5-9  provide 
summary  statistics.  As  the  number  of  observations  for  each  country  in  our  dataset  is  not 
proportionate, we considered two alternatives: the first one has values that are independent of the 
number of observations in each country; the second alternative considers weighted values. The 
distribution is essentially influenced by the UK results. We also calculate the empirical distribution 
of results for overall firms from all countries; distribution was also calculated for overall firms from 
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all countries excluding the UK, as this may be considered an atypical case. In the last case the 
distribution is close to normal. Results are given in tables 10-13. 
Many of the Recommendations’ provisions  have been transposed, although not in full, by 
national  corporate  governance  codes;  implementation  in  the  form  of  legal  requirements  is  less 
common. In practice, the basic recommendations identified by our study, within the three areas, are 
followed; levels of compliance are lower with respect to the more detailed requirements. Some 
firms,  however,  still  do  not  comply  with  even  the  basic  requirements.  For  example,  individual 
disclosure of directors’ remuneration is a fundamental element of adequate disclosure that, in some 
countries, is only required by soft law.
206 Several firms from Austria, Spain, Belgium and Portugal 
still provide only aggregate disclosure, giving explanations for non-compliance that seem somewhat 
unjustifiable.  The  requirement  for  a  vote  on  the  remuneration  policy  has  also  been  poorly 
implemented.
207  This  may  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  most  Member  States  were  late  in 
transposing the Recommendations into national regulations. 
Remuneration disclosure, central to effective remuneration governance, should be simple  
and transparent. But our analysis of the disclosure behaviour of firms from Continental Europe, 
where  there  is  no  legal  requirement  for  a  separate  remuneration  report,  in  comparison  to  the 
disclosure  provided  by  UK  companies  and  by  the  small  number  of  European  companies  that 
produce a separate remuneration report, leads to the conclusion that only a separate remuneration 
report,  providing a bottom line evaluation of the different compensation elements, can provide a 
consolidated, clear and comprehensive overview of the remuneration policy.
208 It is also essential if 
shareholders are to receive reasonably full information on which to base their voting decisions.
209 
Reform  in  this  area  is  necessary.  The  2004  EC  Recommendation  on  directors’  remuneration 
preserves companies’ right to decide internally on remuneration matters; its primary focus is on 
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207 Provision included in the 2004 EC Recommendation on directors remuneration; see analysis of ‘say on pay’ in 
Section 3 of this paper. 
208  See  Gordon,  supra  note  14;  Gordon  had  similar  recommendations  for  US  companies  to  adopt  a  separate 
remuneration report, named “Compensation Discussion & Analysis”. 
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disclosure and transparency and on the approval of remuneration by the appropriate competent 
bodies. But it does not make sufficient recommendations regarding the content of remuneration 
policy. Reforms are necessary if clear and comprehensive disclosure on the remuneration policy is 
to be provided and if a level playing field is to exist between firms. In particular, greater clarity is 
needed on the meaning and content of the remuneration policy; this was raised repeatedly in the 
series of debates we attended on the regulation of remuneration in Europe. The current degree of 
confusion  impacts  negatively  on  the  effectiveness  of  disclosure.  It  would  be  desirable  for  all 
companies to adopt remuneration policies which address the issue of executive remuneration, non-
executive remuneration and share schemes. However, this needs to be clarified at the regulatory 
level, to facilitate the reporting and assessment of remuneration. The Commission strengthens its 
disclosure requirements in its 2009 Recommendation; but it leaves disclosure levels essentially to 
the discretion of the firm, relying on a “sufficient information” formula.
210 
Ultimately, stronger public regulation could lead to higher levels of disclosure given the 
poor compliance associated with soft law. This is not to argue that harmonisation should be an end 
in  itself  and  that  rules  should  be  identical  to  achieve  consistency.  However,  minimum  core 
standards could be adopted and enforced at EU level. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The executive remuneration debate has evolved, in this decade, under the influence of two 
major crises. When the technology bubble blew up and corporate scandals emerged at the beginning 
of this century, stock options and market manipulation became a major cause of concern, while 
short-termism was seen as one of the main culprits. The recent financial crisis has revealed that 
perverse incentives leading to excessive risk-taking and pay for failure are major flaws in executive 
remuneration.  In  this  study  we  explored  the  governance  arrangements,  the  regulatory  trends 
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(including best practices) and the policy debate concerning executive remuneration in Europe, with 
reference to the period leading up to the 2007-2009 crisis. Our main objective was to analyse how 
remuneration  governance  and  structures  emerged  from  the  technology  bubble,  reacted  to  the 
financial crisis and stimulated the remuneration policy debate. Whilst the lessons from the corporate 
scandals  have  not  been  easily applied,  the recent  financial  turmoil  will  no  doubt  lead  to  more 
incisive reforms.  
The current debate on directors’ pay is focused on financial institutions, which are at the 
core of the financial crisis, and on how executive remuneration can deliver better risk management 
and support systemic stability. The new remuneration models being proposed under the current 
reform movement include the performance incentives long associated with executive remuneration 
but they also are designed to penalise failure. Moreover, the proposed models  align incentives with 
corporate strategies but also with  risk policies, emphasising the role of enterprise risk management 
in  setting  executive  remuneration.  They  suggest  a  forward-looking  approach  for  sustainable 
financial  performance  and  recommend  periodic  reviews  of  remuneration  policies  by  the  board. 
Attention  is  increasingly  being  paid  to  stakeholder  value  and  the  fairness  of  pay,  mainly  with 
respect to financial institutions and, in particular, to those receiving public money. Yet not all 
considerations valid for financial institutions are applicable to non-financial firms; for instance, the 
link  between  incentive  pay  and  risk  is  more  problematic  in  financial  institutions,  as  their  risk 
structure is subject to rapid change. Therefore the analysis of directors’ pay at financial institutions 
should not be automatically transposed to other companies.  
But our study underlines, nonetheless, the importance of sound remuneration governance, 
including  disclosure,  board  monitoring  and  shareholder  engagement  for  all  companies.  If 
appropriate  requirements  were  foreseen  by  either  public  regulation  or  best  practices,  detailed 
mandatory  rules  with  respect  to  remuneration  structure  and  levels  would  not  be  necessary  for 
companies generally. The  safety and soundness of financial institutions, however, suggests that 
prudential regulation and supervision incorporate executive remuneration. Moreover, state-owned 77 
 
enterprises could see governments set their remuneration policies, if not individual directors’ pay 
levels. As for non-financial firms, pay design should be recommended by best practices under a 
‘comply  or  explain’  regime,  for  example  with  respect  to  vesting  periods  of  stock  options  and 
awards, termination payments and the choice of non-performance options. 
Despite the importance for non-financial firms of basic governance disciplines with respect 
to executive remuneration, significant difficulties remain which should not be overlooked amidst 
the  current  policy  focus  on  risk  management  and  executive  remuneration.  As  shown  by  our 
empirical  research,  significant  differences  persist  across  Europe  with  respect  to  remuneration 
practices,  despite  the  Commission’s  Recommendations.  Variations  are  generally  linked  with 
differences  in  corporate  governance.  For  instance,  corporate  ownership  may  determine  the 
composition of the remuneration committee, which in concentrated ownership firms often includes 
controlling shareholders, even if the majority of committee members should consist of independent 
directors. Disclosure varies from country to country, being strongly dependent on national laws and 
best practice guidelines. Firms tend to focus on basic requirements, such as the existence of the 
remuneration committee, the adoption of a remuneration policy and the individual disclosure of 
emoluments.  Requirements  for  detailed  disclosure  of  executives’  terms  of  contracts  and 
performance-based remuneration have lower take-up.  
On the policy level, we suggest increased harmonisation of remuneration disclosure, which 
would reduce information costs to investors and allow comparison of remuneration practices across 
Europe. Moreover, mandatory disclosure has an impact on remuneration structures and may lead to 
closer board focus on terms of contracts and severance payments, which currently appear to be 
overlooked in a number of countries. Disclosure is also indispensable for holding the board and the 
remuneration committee accountable towards shareholders and other stakeholders. As suggested in 
this paper, a remuneration report consolidating numerical data and information on the structures and 
policies of directors’ remuneration should be adopted by listed companies across Europe. 78 
 
Disclosure  is  also  essential  for  equipping  the  annual  general  meeting  with  the  tools 
necessary to exercise an annual check on remuneration policies, particularly in countries where an 
advisory or a binding vote is foreseen on those policies. The impact of shareholders’ votes on 
remuneration policy is not yet clear, particularly where the vote is advisory only. Poor disclosure 
has contributed to this situation. Increased shareholder engagement and market discipline would 
also be better achieved by adopting, under a flexible ‘comply or explain’ regime, a binding rather 
than just advisory vote. Moreover, where a vote is not foreseen, the general meeting can always 
hold the board accountable by exerting a vote on its election.  
As shown by this study, the Commission’s efforts to improve standards for the setting and 
disclosure  of  directors’  remuneration  have  had  limited  take-up  at  national  level.  Critics  of  the 
measures accuse the Commission of lacking ambition by opting to issue Recommendations, which 
are not legally binding, instead of pursuing direct legislation. The Commission has relied instead on 
the  ethical  behaviour  of  market  participants  and  on  Member  State  enthusiasm  for  its 
Recommendations. The 2009 Recommendations may fare better given the current political climate, 
but their ambition and the timeframe for implementation may well leave some Member States and 
market participants behind.  Whether they will have a positive impact on remuneration policies 
remains  questionable,  given  the  ambition  of  the  current  proposals  and  the  limited  success  of 
previous  reforms.  Moreover,  history  has  taught  us  that  companies  often  find  ways  to  elude 
limitations on compensation through adjustments of optimal compensation contracts. Ultimately, 
significant difficulties still remain with basic governance disciplines for all companies, concerning 
the remuneration committee, disclosure, and the advisory vote, which should not be overlooked as 
the European economy strives to recover.  
 
 
 
 79 
 
REFERENCES 
Aggarwal,  R.  and  R.  Williamson  (2006),  Did  New  Regulations  Target  the  Relevant  Corporate 
Governance  Attributes?,  Working  Paper,  Georgetown  University;  available  at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=891411. 
Ammann,  M.,  D.  Oesch  and  M.  Schmid  (2009),  Corporate  Governance  and  Firm  Value: 
International  Evidence,  Swiss  Institute  of  Banking  and  Finance,  University  of  St.  Gallen, 
Switzerland. 
Barca, F. and M. Becht (eds.) (2001), “The Control of Corporate Europe”, Oxford University Press. 
Bebchuk, L., J. Fried and D. Walker (2002), Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design 
of Executive Compensation, University of Chicago Law Review 69, 751-846. 
Bebchuk, L. and J. Fried (2003), Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, vol. 17, pp. 71-92. 
Bebchuk, L. and J. Fried (2004), “Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive 
Compensation”, Harvard University Press. 
Bebchuk, L. (2005), The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 118, 
No. 3, pp. 833-914, January 2005  (Previously titled The Case for Empowering Shareholders). 
Bebchuk,  L.  and  H.  Spamann  (2009),  Regulating  Bankers’  Pay,  Georgetown  Law  Journal, 
Forthcoming,  Harvard  Law  and  Economics  School  Discussion  Paper  No.  641,  available  at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1410072.  
Bhagat, B. and B. Black (2002), The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long 
Term Firm Performance, Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 27, p. 231-273. 
Bhagat, S., B. Bolton and R. Romano (2007), The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance 
Indices, ECGI Law Working Paper No. 89/2007, Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 367, 
available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1019921. 
Bhagat, S. and R. Romano (2009), Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing 
to the Long-Term, Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 374. 
Bolton, P., J. Scheinkman and W. Xiong (2005), Pay for Short-Term Performance: Executive 
Compensation in Speculative Markets, ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 79/2005, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=691142. 
Brown, L.D. and M.L. Caylor (2008), Corporate Governance and Firm Operating Performance, 
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting  32, 129–144. 
Bruno, V. and S. Claessens (2007), Corporate Governance and Regulation: Can There be Too 
Much of a Good Thing?, ECGI Finance Working Paper No. 142/2007 AND World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper; available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=956329. 
Cheffins, B. and R. Thomas (2001), Should Shareholders Have a Greater Say Over Executive Pay? 
Learning from the US Experience, Journal of Corporate Law Studies 1: 277-315.  
Cheffins,  B.  R.  (2009),  Did  Corporate  Governance  “Fail”  During  the  2008  Stock  Market 
Meltdown?    The  Case  of  the  S&P  500,  ECGI  Law  Working  Paper;  available  at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1396126 80 
 
Chhaochharia,  V.  and  Laeven.  L.  (2007),  Corporate  Governance,  Norms  and  Practices,  ECGI 
Finance  Working  Paper  No.  165/2007;  available  at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=965733. 
Clementi, G.L. and T. Cooley (2009), Executive Compensation: Facts, Preliminary Working Paper, 
NYU. 
Coffee, J. (2003), What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 
Columbia  Law  School,  Center  for  Law  and  Economics,  Working  Paper  No.  214;  available  at 
http://www.ssrn.org/abstract_id=373581.  
Coffee, J.C. Jr. (2003), Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant 
Reforms, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 237.  
Coffee, J.C. Jr. and John C. (2005) A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the U.S. and Europe 
Differ, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 21(2), p. 198–211. 
Cohen, D., A. Dey and L. Thomas  (2007), The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Implications for  
Compensation  Structure  and  Managerial  Risk-Taking;  
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1027448. 
Core, J. and W. Guay, (1999), The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Equity Incentive 
Levels, Journal of Accounting and Economics 28, 151-184. 
Core, J.E., R.G. Wayne and R.S. Thomas (2004), Is US CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without 
Performance, Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 05-05; U of Penn, Inst for Law 
& Econ Research Paper 05-13. 
Conyon, M. and D. Leech (1994), Top Pay, Company Performance and Corporate Governance, 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 56, 229. 
Cox, J. and J. Payne (2005), Mutual Fund Expense Disclosures: A Behavioural Perspective, 83 
Washington University Law Quarterly 907. 
Davies,  P.  (2006),  Enron  and  Corporate  Governance  Reform  in  the  UK  and  the  European 
Community, in J. Armour and J. A. McCahery (eds.), “After Enron: Improving Corporate Law and 
Modernising Securities Regulation in Europe and the US”, Oxford: Hart Publications.  
Deakin, S. and S. J. Konzelmann (2006), After Enron: An Age of Enlightenment?, in J. Armour and 
J.  A.  McCahery  (eds.),  “After  Enron:  Improving  Corporate  Law  and  Modernising  Securities 
Regulation in Europe and the US”, Oxford: Hart Publications. 
Enriques,  L.  and  P.  F.  Volpin  (2007),  Corporate  Governance  Reforms  in  Continental  Europe, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 117-140. 
Fernandes, N. (2005), Board Compensation and Firm Performance: The Role of “Independent” 
Board Members, ECGI Finance Working Paper No. 104/2005. 
Ferrarini, G., N. Moloney and C. Vespro (2003), Executive Remuneration in the EU: Comparative 
Law and Practice, ECGI Law Working Paper. 81 
 
Ferrarini, G., N. Moloney and C. Vespro (2004), Governance Matters: Convergence in Law and 
Practice Across the EU Corporate Governance Faultline, in Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 
Hart Publishing, Cambridge (UK), p. 243. 
Ferrarini, G. and N. Moloney (2004), Executive Remuneration and Corporate Governance in the 
EU: Convergence, Divergence, and Reform Perspectives, in Ferrarini, Hopt, Winter, Wymeersch 
(Eds.), “Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe”, Oxford University Press, p. 267. 
Ferrarini, G. and N. Moloney (2005), Executive Remuneration in the EU: The Context for Reform, 
21 Oxford Review of Economic Policy, p. 304. 
Ferrarini, G. (2005), Grande paghe, piccoli risultati: “rendite” dei managers e possibili rimedi (a 
proposito di un libro recente), Rivista della Società, N.4. 
Ferrarini, G. and P. Giudici, (2005) Financial Scandals and the Role of Private Enforcement: The 
Parmalat Case, in Armour, McCahery (Eds.), “After Enron”, Hart Publisher, 2006, p. 159.  
Ferrarini, G. and M.C. Ungureanu (2009), Fixing Bankers’ Pay in Europe: Governance, Regulation 
and Disclosure, Proceedings of the “Symposium on  Building the Financial System of the 21st 
Century. An Agenda for Europe and the US”; Unimanagement Torino, 27-28 March 2009 (Program 
on International Financial Systems, Harvard Law School). 
Gabaix, X. and A. Landier (2009), Why has CEO Pay Increased so Much?, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 123, 49-100, 2008. 
Gordon, J. (2005), Executive Compensation: If There’s a Problem, What’s the Remedy? The Case 
for Compensation Disclosure and Analysis, Journal of Corporation Law. 
Gordon,  J.  (2007),  The  Rise  of  Independent  Directors  in  the  United  States,  1950-2005:  Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 59, No 6. 
Gordon, J. (2008), Say-on-Pay: Cautionary Notes on the UK Experience and the Case for 
Shareholder Opt-In, ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 117/2009, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1262867 
Hall, B. and J. Liebman (1997), Are CEOs Really Paid Like Beaurocrats? NBER Working Paper 
No. 6213, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2086. 
Hill,  J.,  (2006),  Regulating  Executive  Remuneration:  International  Developments  in  the  Post-
Scandal Era, European Company Law, Vol. 3, p. 64. 
Holmstrom, B., Moral Hazard in Teams (1982), Bell Journal of Economics 13, 324-340, 1982. 
Holmstron, B. and S. Kaplan (2003), The State of the US Corporate Governance: What’s Right and 
What’s Wrong? ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 23/2003, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=441100. 
Holmstrom,  B.  (2005),  Pay  without  Performance  and  the  Managerial  Power  Hypothesis:  A 
Comment, Journal of Corporation Law, 30(4), 703-713 (2005). 
Jensen, M. and W. Meckling (1976), Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Cost and 
Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, V. 3, No. 4, p. 305-360. 82 
 
Jensen, M. and K. J. Murphy (1990), Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives,' Journal of 
Political  Economy  p.  225-265;  reprinted  in  Michael  C.  Jensen,  “Foundations  of  Organizational 
Strategy”, (Harvard University Press, 1998). 
Jensen, M. and K. Murphy (2004), Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got Here, What are 
the Problems and How to Fix Them, Harvard NOM Working Paper No. 04-28 and ECGI Finance 
Working Paper No. 44/2004, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=561305.  
Kolla, P. (2004), The Mannesmann Trial and the Role of the Courts, 5 German Law Journal No 7 – 
Private Law. 
Kraakmann, R. (2004), Disclosure and Corporate Governance: An Overview Essay’ in Ferrarini, G, 
Hopt, K, Winter J, and Wymeersch, E (eds), “Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe”,  
Oxford University Press, 95. 
Milhaupt, C.J. and K. Pistor (2008), The Mannesmann Executive Compensation Trial in Germany, 
in  “Law  and  Capitalism,  What  Corporate  Crises  Reveal  About  Legal  Systems  and  Economic 
Development around the World”, The University of Chicago Press 
Oyer, P. and S. Shaefer (2004), Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees? An 
Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories, Journal of Financial Economics 76, 99-133. 
Perry, T. And Zenner, M. (2001), Pay for Performance? Government Regulation and the Structure 
of Compensation Contracts, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 62, issue 3, p. 453-488. 
Posner, R. (2009), Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, If So, What if Anything Should Be Done 
About It?, 58 Duke L.J. 1013. 
Rolshoven, M.P. (2004), The Last Word? – The July 22, 2004 Acquittals in the Mannesmann Trial,  
5 German Law Review No 8. 
Sants, H., Recent Market Events and the FSA’s Response, Speech, FSA, 20 May 2008. 
Thomas, R. (2008), International Executive Pay: Current Practices and Future Trends, Vanderbilt 
Law  and  Economics  Research  Paper  No.  08-26;  available  at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1265122. 
Van der Elst, C. (2008), The Belgian Struggle for Corporate Governance Improvements, ECGI Law 
Working  Paper,  N°.114/2008,  available  at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1261448. 
Viral A. and M. Richardson (Eds.) (2009), “Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed 
System”, NYU Stern.   83 
 
Annex 1. Criteria evaluation 
 
I.  Area 1: Governance 
 
Category 1: Remuneration Committee 
 
-Criterion 1: Existence  
The existence of a remuneration committee set up within the (supervisory) board, either separate or 
joined with nomination committee or as appropriate, that has as (among) its main tasks, the process 
for setting remuneration of directors.  
-Criterion 2: Composition 
The  composition  of  the  remuneration  committee  made  up  of  all  non-executive,  majority 
independent directors. 
 
II. Area 2: Remuneration policy 
 
Category 2: Remuneration policy statement 
 
-Criterion 3: Statement: existent 
The disclosure of the remuneration statement as part of an independent remuneration report / annual 
accounts / notes to the annual accounts. 
-Criterion 4: Overview of the policy  
Description of the manner in which the remuneration policy was implemented in the financial year 
in review; policy must be described, apart from numerical information. 
-Criterion 5: Forward-looking  
Remuneration statement having a focus on the remuneration policy for the following financial year / 
subsequent years. 
 
Category 3: Terms of contracts of executive directors 
 
-Criterion 6: Duration of contracts 
Duration of terms of contracts of executive directors in the remuneration statement / in the tabular 
format of remuneration details. (If elsewhere in the annual report, we do not consider it as conform, 
as the details could be missed because of the variety of ways information is presented; hence it 
would not provide consistency in evaluation.) 
-Criterion 7: Notice periods 
Disclosure of the applicable notice period in the remuneration statement. 
-Criterion 8: Termination payments 
Details of provisions for termination payments under contracts for executive directors. The actual 
amount without description of the policy is not considered as conforming. 
 
Category 4: Preparatory and decision-making process 
 
-Criterion 9: Mandate and composition of the Remuneration Committee 
Details presented either in the remuneration statement or in the corporate governance section of the 
annual report. (Although the EC Recommendation requires this information to be disclosed under 
the statement, our research shows that most firms in Continental Europe provide this information 
under a separate section, due to specific countries’ reporting requirements.) 
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-Criterion 10: External consultants 
Disclosure of the names of external consultants whose services have been used in determination of 
the remuneration policy; or statement of not using an external consultant, if such the case. 
 
-Criterion 11: Role of the general meeting 
Explanation of the general meeting’s role in the process for setting the remuneration. Conformity is 
considered  also  in  the  situation  where  no  detailed  information  is  provided,  but  the  role  of  the 
general meeting in approving the remuneration policy / report can be inferred. 
 
Category 5: Information in the remuneration statement 
 
-Criterion 12: Relative importance fixed-variable 
Explanation of the relative importance of the non-variable and variable remuneration understood as 
the ration between the two components. 
-Criterion 13: Main parameters for annual bonus 
Disclosure of financial / non-financial performance criteria applied as targets for the annual bonus 
scheme. 
-Criterion 14: Performance criteria share-based remuneration 
Disclosure of financial / non-financial performance criteria applied as targets for the share-based 
remuneration. 
-Criterion 15: Information link remuneration – performance 
Providing  sufficient  information  on  the  linkage  between  remuneration  and  performance: 
performance  criteria  for  annual  incentives  and  for  share  plans  evaluation  and  achievement  of 
performance criteria. 
 
III.   Area 3: Individual disclosure 
 
Category 6: Individual disclosure 
 
-Criterion 16: Individual disclosure executives 
Disclosure  of    numerical  information  for  each  executive  director,  in  the  remuneration  report  / 
annual accounts / notes to the annual accounts. 
-Criterion 17: Individual disclosure non-executives 
Disclosure of  numerical information for each non-executive director, in the remuneration report / 
annual accounts / notes to the annual accounts. 
 
Category 7: Emoluments 
 
-Criterion 18: Salary / fees 
Individual  disclosure  of  basic  salary  paid  to  executive  directors  /  fees  paid  to  non-executive 
directors. 
-Criterion 19: Bonus & benefits 
Individual disclosure of bonuses paid to each executive or non-executive director. 
-Criterion 20: Remuneration preceding year 
Individual disclosure of the remuneration paid to directors in the preceding financial year. 
 
Category 8: Share-incentive schemes 
 
-Criterion 21: Share / options granted 
Individual disclosure of number of share options granted / offered during the relevant financial year, 
or of the value at grant date. 85 
 
-Criterion 22: Share / options exercised 
Individual  disclosure  of  number  of  shares  exercised  during  the  relevant  financial  year  and  the 
exercise price for each plan. 
-Criterion  23: Share / options unexercised 
Individual disclosure of number of shares unexercised at the end of the financial year, exercise 
price, exercise date.  
 
 
Annex 2. Tables and figures 
 
 
Table 1. Overview of countries included in the sample 
 
Country  Observations (no. of firms) 
Austria  7 
Belgium  11 
Denmark  5 
Finland  5 
France  55 
Germany  34 
Greece   7 
Italy  20 
Ireland  5 
Netherlands  14 
Norway  8 
Portugal  5 
Spain  21 
Sweden  14 
Switzerland  20 
UK  64 
Total  295 
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Table 2. Overview of criteria 
 
Analysis  %  of  firms  meeting 
criteria 
Area: GOVERNANCE  71.1% 
Catgory: Remuneration Committee  71.1% 
1.  RC: existence  82.7% 
2.  RC: composition  59.7% 
Area: REMUNERATION POLICY  56.3% 
Category: Remuneration policy statement  70.4% 
3.  Statement:  existent  92.8% 
4.  Overview of the policy  91.8% 
5.  Forward-looking  26.4% 
Category: Terms of contracts  45.9% 
6.  Duration of contracts  39.6% 
7.  Notice periods  36.6% 
8.  Termination payments  61.3% 
Category: Preparatory and decision-making process  59.4% 
9.  Mandate and composition RC  75.9% 
10.  External consultants  32.8% 
11.  Role of the general meeting  69.5% 
Category: Policy information  51.3% 
12.  Relative importance fixed-variable  55.6% 
13.  Main parameters annual bonus  64.0% 
14.  Performance criteria share-based remuneration  56.0% 
15.  Information link remuneration-performance  29.9% 
Area: INDIVIDUAL DISCLOSURE EXEC. & NON-EXEC.  58.1% 
Category: Individual disclosure  73.6% 
16.  Individual disclosure executives  66.8% 
17.  Individual disclosure non-executives  80.3% 
Category: Emoluments  59.3% 
18.  Ssalary/fee  67.1% 
19.  Bonus & other benefits  66.8% 
20.  Preceding year  44.0% 
Category: Share-incentive schemes  46.7% 
21.  SO granted  59.0% 
22.  SO exercised  42.0% 
23.  SO unexercised  39.0% 
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Table 3. Distribution of criteria: summary statistics 
 
Country  No. 
Firms 
Average DoC (M)  Variance   Std. Deviation (σ) 
Overall (per total)  295  171.87  3121.33  55.87 
 
M-2σ  M-σ  M-σ  M  M  M+σ  M+σ  M+2σ 
60  116  116  172  172  228  228  284 
-Forward looking 
-Notice periods 
-External consultants 
-Sufficient info linkage 
remuneration-
performance 
-Share options 
unexercised 
  
  
  
  
-Duration of contracts 
-Relative importance fixed-
variable 
-Performance criteria share-
based remuneration 
 -Information preceding 
year 
-Share options exercised 
  
  
- RC: composition 
- Termination payments 
 -Mandate and composition RC 
 -Role of the AGM 
 -Parameters annual bonus 
 -Individual disclosure 
executives 
 -Individual salary/fee 
 -Individual bonus & other 
benefits 
- Shares/Share options 
offered/granted 
 -RC: existence 
 -Statement:  existent 
 -Overview of the policy 
 -Individual disclosure 
non-exec  
  
  
  
Low interest criteria  Interested criteria 
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Figure 1. Firm compliance with each criteria (grouped under categories and areas)  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Firm compliance with each criteria (in descending order) 
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Figure 3. Firm compliance with criteria in the 3 main areas 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Firm compliance with criteria in the 3 main areas (breakdown on countries) 
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Figure 5. Firm compliance with criteria in the 8 categories 
 
  
 
Figure 6. Firm compliance with criteria in the Governance area 
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Figure 7. Firm compliance with criteria in the Remuneration Policy area 
 
  
 
Figure 8. Firm compliance with criteria in the Individual Disclosure area 
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Figure 9. Firm compliance with the Consolidation criteria 
 
  
Figure 10. Firm compliance with the Benchmark Disclosure criteria 
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Table 4. Degree of conformity per countries 
 
Country  Overall   Governance 
Remuneration 
policy 
Individual 
disclosure 
Austria  32.3%  50.0%  39.2%  21.4% 
Belgium  39.1%  59.1%  39.9%  33.0% 
Denmark  33.0%  30.0%  35.4%  30.0% 
Finland  36.5%  40.0%  40.0%  30.0% 
France  55.6%  82.7%  48.3%  60.7% 
Germany  43.2%  4.4%  39.4%  59.2% 
Greece  16.2%  50.0%  17.6%  5.4% 
Ireland  70.4%  90.0%  49.2%  100.0% 
Italy  49.8%  77.5%  41.5%  56.3% 
Netherlands  85.4%  92.9%  81.9%  89.3% 
Norway  57.6%  50.0%  55.8%  62.5% 
Portugal  34.8%  90.0%  47.7%  0.0% 
Spain  32.1%  66.7%  34.4%  19.6% 
Sweden  48.1%  71.4%  62.1%  19.6% 
Switzerland  45.7%  85.0%  47.7%  32.5% 
UK  95.4%  99.2%  93.5%  97.5% 
 
 
Table 5. Distributions of criteria per countries: averages 
 
Country  Observations 
Maximum 
DoC 
Actual 
DoC 
DoC 
(%) 
Firms’  Avg 
DoC 
Weighted 
Avg 
Austria  7  161  52  32.3%  7.429  52.000 
Belgium  11  253  99  39.1%  9.000  99.000 
Denmark  5  115  38  33.0%  7.600  38.000 
Finland  5  115  42  36.5%  8.400  42.000 
France  55  1265  703  55.6%  12.782  702.999 
Germany  34  782  338  43.2%  9.941  337.997 
Greece  7  161  26  16.1%  3.714  25.999 
Ireland  5  115  81  70.4%  16.200  81.000 
Italy  20  460  229  49.8%  11.450  229.000 
Netherlands  14  322  275  85.4%  19.643  274.999 
Norway  8  184  106  57.6%  13.250  106.000 
Portugal  5  115  40  34.8%  8.000  40.000 
Spain  21  483  155  32.0%  7.381  154.999 
Sweden  14  322  155  48.1%  11.545  161.636 
Switzerland  20  460  210  45.7%  10.500  210.000 
UK  64  1472  1404  95.4%  21.938  1404.000 
  295  6785  3953    178.772  3959.629 
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Table 6. Distributions of criteria per countries: deviations 
 
  Country  Avg  Deviations 
i  UK  21.938  -10.764 
ii  Netherlands  19.643  -8.470 
iii  Ireland  16.200  -5.027 
iv  Norway  13.250  -2.077 
v  France  12.782  -1.609 
vi  Sweden  11.545  -0.372 
vii  Italy  11.450  -0.277 
viii  Switzerland  10.500  0.673 
ix  Germany  9.941  1.232 
x  Belgium  9.000  2.173 
xi  Finland  8.400  2.773 
xii  Portugal  8.000  3.173 
xiii  Denmark  7.600  3.573 
xiv  Austria  7.429  3.745 
xv  Spain  7.381  3.792 
xvi  Greece  3.714  7.459 
 
 
Table 7. Distributions of criteria per countries: summary statistics 
 
Avg (M`)                 11.17 
Weighted Avg (M``)              13.42 
Variance  21.33 
Std deviation  4.62 
Weighted Variance  28.10 
Weighted Std deviation  5.30 
 
 
Table  8.  Distribution  of  results  for  all  countries  (values  independent  from  the  number  of 
observations within each country) 
 
  M`-2σ                M`-σ                  M`                M`+ σ  M`+2σ                M`+3σ 
0.00                          1.93  6.55  11.17  15.79  20.41  25.03 
                  0               xvi (1)         viii-xv (8)    iv-vii (4)        ii-iii (2)          i (1) 
 
 
Table 9. Distribution of results for all countries (values considering the number of observations 
within each country) 
 
  M``-2σ                M``-σ                  M``              M``+ σ  M``+2σ                 
                     2.82  8.12  13.42  18.72  24.02   
                              xii-xvi (5)          iv-xi (8)         iii (1)             i-ii (2)             
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Table 10. Distribution of criteria per overall companies in all countries: summary statistics 
 
Avg (M)                 13.41 
Variance  33.89 
Std deviation  5.82 
 
 
Table 11. Distribution of results per overall companies in all countries 
 
  M-2σ                M-σ                  M                M+ σ  M+2σ                 
                        1.77  7.59  13.4  19.23  25.05   
                                      48                118                61                 68             
 
 
Table 12. Distribution of criteria per overall companies in all countries, except for UK:  
summary statistics 
 
Avg (M)                 11.03 
Variance  21.45 
Std deviation  4.63 
 
 
Table 13. Distribution of results per overall companies in all countries, except for UK 
 
  M-2σ                M-σ                  M                M+ σ  M+2σ                M+3σ               
             0           1.77  6.40  11.03  15.66  20.29  24.92 
                 5                    40                78                73                  29                  6 
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